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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CINDY DEATS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 860372 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Petitioner accurately presented the points 
essential to this Court's consideration of her petition pursuant 
to Rule 46(e), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court? 
2. Whether the decision by the Utah Court of Appeals 
conflicts with prior decisions by this Court? 
3. Whether C.S.B. is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to 
Rule 33, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court? 
REPORT OF OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The decision of the Court of Appeals in the above-entitled 
case is officially reported. See, Peats v. Commercial Security 
Bank, 746 P.2d 1191 (Utah App. 1987). 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION 
The grounds alleged by the Petitioner in an attempt to 
persuade this Court to exercise judicial discretion and consider 
review by a Writ of Certiorari, do not constitute "special and 
important" reasons within the meaning of Rule 43, Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. In particular, the Court of Appeals1 
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affirmance of the jury's verdict finding that Commercial Security 
Bank ("C.S.B,") was not negligent, did not raise any questions of 
state law in conflict with any decisions of this Court. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF STATUTES 
Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court (See, Appendix) 
Rule 33, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court (See, Appendix) 
Rule 40, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court (See, Appendix) 
Rule 46(e), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court (See, Appendix) 
Rule 40, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeal (See, Appendix) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about September 24, 1984, the Petitioner commenced a 
negligence action against C.S.B. On March 18 and 20, 1986, the 
action was tried before a jury of 8 members. The jurors were 
read 39 jury instructions by the Honorable David E. Roth, 
including Instruction No. 25, which was the sole instruction 
relied upon by Petitioner for purposes of her appeal to the Court 
of Appeals. The jury was instructed on comparative negligence, 
the duty of care required of business invitors and the duty of 
care required of a Plaintiff in a negligence action. The jury 
returned a special verdict finding that C.S.B. was not negligent 
and judgment was entered on April 8, 1986. On April 17, 1986, 
Petitioner filed her Motion for New Trial. On June 2, 1986, the 
Petitioner's Motion for a New Trial was heard and denied by the 
Court. 
On or about July 7, 1986, Petitioner filed a Notice of 
Appeal. On November 24, 1987, the case was argued before a panel 
400559.jae 2 
of the Utah Court of Appeals. On December 15, 1987, the Court of 
Appeals filed its decision Peats v. Commercial Security Bank, 746 
P.2d 1191 (Utah App. 1987). The Court of Appeals held that the 
trial court properly denied Petitioner's motion for a new trial, 
the jury's verdict that CSB was not negligent was adequately 
supported by the evidence and that Instruction No. 25, when read 
with the other instructions, was a correct statement of a 
Plaintiff's duty in a negligence action. See, Peats v. 
Commercial Security Bank. 746 P.2d at 1194. On or about January 
13, 1988, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari was filed by 
Plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On Monday, February 27, 1984, Plaintiff drove up the three 
ramps in the CSB parking lot and found a place to park on the 
fourth level at approximately 7:05 a.m. (T. at 69, 71, 73 and 
125.) Plaintiff's car slid while driving up the parking ramps 
and she walked very carefully because she could see how very, 
very icy it was while walking away from her parking place. (T. 
at 72-73, 78-89 and 125.) Plaintiff arrived at work prior to 
business hours and the time that most persons that used the 
parking lot arrived. (T. at 70, 164-154 and 193.) Plaintiff 
arrived prior to sunrise at a time when the coldest temperatures 
are commonly recorded. (T. at 213.) On that Monday morning, 
following a winter snowstorm, Plaintiff was the first person to 
arrive at the parking lot. (T. at 69-70 and 125.) Indeed, 
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Plaintiff stated that another person was not expected to arrive 
for 25 minutes. (T. at 70, 128.) 
After the Plaintiff had parked her car and was walking 
towards the stairwell to exit the parking terrace, she thought 
about how slippery the parking terrace was, and that the next car 
that came up the ramp might slide into her car. (T. at 79.) 
Accordingly, Plaintiff turned around and walked very carefully, 
because of the icy conditions, back toward her car to move it 
into a safer parking space. (T. at 79-80.) As Plaintiff 
approached the front of her car, she slipped and fell. (T. at 
80.) An individual in a van was on the top level of the lot to 
spread salt or sand by the time Plaintiff had regained her 
balance and was again standing upright, somewhere between 7:10 
and 7:20 a.m. (T. at 83, 84 and 130-131.) Plaintiff proceeded 
back down the stairwell from the fourth level and across the 
street to work, where she remained until later that afternoon. 
(T. at 85.) 
ARGUMENT I 
PETITIONER FAILED TO ACCURATELY PRESENT THE POINTS 
ESSENTIAL TO A CONSIDERATION OF THE PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI 
Review by a Writ of Certiorari is a matter of judicial 
discretion and special and important reasons must be proven for 
the Court to grant the petition. See, Rule 43, Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. Petitioner initially asserts that a Writ should 
be issued by the Court because Peats v. Commercial Security 
Bank, conflicts with principles of law in Moore v. Burton Lumber 
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& Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865 (Utah 1981); Jacobsen Construction 
Co. , Inc. v. Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc., 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 
1980) and Stephens v. Henderson. 741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987). 
However, Petitioner's justification for issuance of a Writ of 
Certiorari does not support her initial assertion, since she 
merely contends that the decisions by the Utah Supreme Court 
"seem to indicate that a jury should" focus on a different duty 
of care for the injured party and Instruction No. 25 contains 
language that "implies" a contrary duty of care. 
The Petitioner's contention that the cases seem to indicate 
a different duty of care than that implied in Instruction No. 25 
is an insufficient reason for the Court to exercise its 
discretion to issue a Writ of Certiorari. Indeed, Rule 43, 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, expressly provides that an 
instance appropriate for review is "[w]hen a panel of the Court 
of Appeals has decided a question of state or federal law in a 
way that is in conflict with a decision of this court..." In the 
present case, Petitioner does not clearly identify any 
unqualified issues of state law that the Court of Appeals has 
decided in a way that conflict with a decision of this Court. 
Moreover, the purported justification for review of Petitioner's 
case does not present special and important reasons for granting 
review by a Writ of Certiorari. Petitioner's most elaborate 
argument is that jury instruction No. 25, when read by itself, 
was an incorrect statement of law. The Court of Appeals, 
however, rejected strict construction of instruction No. 25 in 
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disregard of the thirty-eight other jury instructions. Thus, 
Petitioner has simply attempted to re-allege a technical ground 
for issuance of the Writ which was previously rejected by the 
Court of Appeals and the trial court. 
Petitioner's qualified, conditional and ambiguous claims 
that a conflict exists between decisions by the Utah Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals fail to establish special and 
important reasons for granting review. The failure and inability 
of Petitioner to allege with particularity reasons for this Court 
to exercise its discretion and review the case constitutes a 
failure to accurately present points essential for consideration 
of the petition. Therefore, the provisions of Rule 46(e), Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court, mandate that the petition should be 
denied. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE DECISION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT CONFLICT 
WITH PRIOR DECISIONS BY THIS COURT 
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals1 decision 
conflicts with principles of law in certain Utah Supreme Court 
opinions. However, the Court of Appeals explicitly relied upon 
the applicable principles set forth in the Utah Supreme Court 
decisions. 
First, the Court of Appeals noted that Petitioner attempted 
to impeach the jury's verdict that C.S.B. was not negligent. The 
Court of Appeals noted that it was well-settled that an 
appellate court should review the jury verdict "in the light 
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most favorable to the prevailing party, and accord the evidence 
presented and every reasonable inference fairly drawn from the 
evidence the same degree of deference." Peats v. Commercial 
Security Bank, 746 P. 2d at 1192 (relying upon Jacobsen 
Construction. Co. Inc. v. Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc., 619 
P.2d at 308). 
Preliminarily, the Court of Appeals found that the evidence 
presented must demonstrate that the business invitor failed to 
meet the requisite duty of care. This duty of care was best 
described as follows: 
The essential inquiry relating to defendant's 
negligence is whether the defendant's employees know, or in 
the exercise of ordinary care should have known that a 
dangerous condition existed, and whether sufficient time 
elapsed thereafter that action could have been taken to 
correct the situation. Owners of stores, banks, office 
buildings, theaters of other public buildings where the 
public is invited to come on business or for pleasure are 
not insurers against all forms of accidents that may happen 
to any who come. 
Martin v. Safewav Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977); 
see also. Peats v. Commercial Security Bank, 746 P.2d at 1192. 
In accordance with the invitorfs duty of care the Court of 
Appeals found that the jury verdict was adequately supported by 
the evidence that C.S.B. was servicing the fourth level of 
C.S.B.'s parking lot at the time Petitioner arrived, that 
Petitioner admittedly knew the level was icy, that Petitioner 
conceded that she did not have to park on that level and that 
Petitioner arrived prior to sunrise. Moreover, Petitioner's 
attempted impeachment of the jury verdict with affidavits 
concerning the jurors' purported failure to understand 
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Instruction No. 25 was found to be in direct contravention of 
Rule 59(a)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See also, Rosenlof 
v. Sullivan, 676 P.2d 373,375 (Utah 1983). 
Second, the Court of Appeals relied heavily upon Moore v. 
Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, and Jacobsen 
Construction Co., Inc. v. Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc.. 619 
P.2d 306, to reject Petitioner's assertion that Instruction No. 
25 misstated the law concerning an injured party's duty of care. 
Thus, it is ironic that Petitioner would assert that these same 
cases are in conflict with the Court of Appeals' decision. 
Petitioner contends that Instruction No. 25 implies that if 
Petitioner was at all negligent, she is barred from recovery. 
Instruction No. 25 provides as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
Ordinarily, a Plaintiff in any action has the 
duty of seeing and avoiding, if reasonable, 
a hazard which is plainly visible, and if 
the Plaintiff reasonably failed to d o 
so, then the Plaintiff is negligent either in 
failing to look or in failing to heed 
what he or she saw. 
Instruction No. 25 does not constitute an impermissible 
"assumption of risk" instruction under Utah's comparative 
negligence statutes. The Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner's 
allegations that Instruction No. 25 improperly included 
principles of assumption of risk, as follows: 
Under Utah's comparative negligence statute, 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-38 (1987), and 
its accompanying definition counterpart, Utah 
Code Ann. Section 78-27-37 (1987), the 
concept of contributory negligence includes 
what was formerly termed secondary assumption 
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of risk: "the unreasonable encountering of 
a known and appreciated risk." Moore v. 
Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. . 631 P.2d 865, 
870 (Utah 1981); see, Jacobsen Constr. Co. 
619 P.2d at 310, 312. More specifically, 
the reasonableness of Plaintiff's 
conduct in confronting a known or 
unknown risk created by defendant's 
negligence will basically be 
determined under principles of 
contributory negligence. 
Attention should be focused on 
whether a reasonably prudent man 
in the exercise of due care would 
have incurred the risk, despite 
his knowledge of it, and if so, 
whether he would have conducted 
himself in the manner in which the 
Plaintiff acted in light of all the 
surrounding circumstances, 
including the appreciated risk. 
Jacobsen Constr. Co., 619 P.2d at 312. 
Peats v. Commercial Security Bank, 746 P.2d 1193-94. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the ordinary and usual 
meaning of Instruction No. 25, when read together with all of the 
other instructions, was that "the jury must apportion negligence 
if both parties were found to have acted negligently." Id. at 
60. 
In Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865 (Utah 
1981), the Court expressly considered the issues concerning 
comparative negligence and assumption of risk. The jury verdict 
indicated that Plaintiff and Defendant were negligent, but only 
Defendant was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's personal 
injuries. Defendant claimed that the trial court improperly 
refused to instruct the jury that there was no duty to warn a 
business invitee of an obvious danger. The Court ruled that the 
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trial court should have instructed the jury that Defendant had no 
duty to warn of an obvious danger, but failure to so instruct the 
jury was harmless error. Thus, the Court expressly ruled that a 
jury instruction substantially similar to the instruction given 
in the present case, should have been read to the jury by the 
trial court. 
Additionally, the Court considered the trial court's refusal 
to instruct the jury concerning the doctrine of assumption of 
risk. The Court explained that three different legal concepts 
are embodied by the doctrine of assumption of risk. The two 
widely recognized forms are "primary express" and "primary 
implied" assumption of risk. Primary express assumption of risk 
was defined as "an agreement by the Plaintiff to accept the risk 
or danger, and the primary implied form involves a relationship 
in which Defendant simply owes no duty of care to the Plaintiff." 
Id. The third form is "secondary" assumption of risk, which 
involves an aspect of contributory negligence, since it is the 
unreasonable encountering of a known and appreciated risk. The 
Jacobsen Construction Co., Inc. opinion was cited as controlling 
regarding the distinction between comparative negligence and 
assumption of risk and the Court, therefore, quoted at length 
from Jacobsen Construction Co. Specifically, to the extent that 
the doctrine of assumption of risk involves the reasonableness of 
a Plaintiff's confrontation of a known and appreciated risk and 
the manner in which a Plaintiff acted in light of all the 
surrounding circumstances, the principles of assumption of risk 
400559.jae 10 
will basically be determined under principles of contributory 
negligence• The Court concluded that instructions on both 
assumption of risk and contributory negligence were proper, but 
not necessary in that case. 
Accordingly, the Moore and Jacobsen Construction Co. 
opinions are additional authority in support of Instruction No. 
25, not cases which conflict with Peats v. Commercial Security 
Bank. 
In Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 953, 955 (Utah 1987), the 
Court simply relied upon the Jacobsen Construction Co. decision, 
found the above-referenced principles controlling and affirmed 
the jury's verdict for Plaintiff in a personal injury action. 
The Court, however, held that that trial court properly refused 
to give a separate assumption of risk jury instruction, since it 
was treated under the contributory negligence instructions. 
In conclusion, the jury verdict, particularly when reviewed 
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, was 
supported by ample evidence that C.S.B. met or exceeded the 
requisite duty of care for a business invitor and, therefore, was 
not negligent. Moreover, Instruction No. 25 was a correct 
statement of Petitioner's duty of care under the applicable case 
law, including Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. , Jacobsen 
Construction Co., Inc. v. Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc. and 
Stephens v. Henderson. In fact, as the Court of Appeals noted, 
the cited Utah Supreme Court cases explicitly provide that an 
assumption of risk instruction is proper where the contributory 
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negligence instructions, when read as a whole, require the jury 
to apportion negligence if both parties were found to have acted 
negligently. Finally, this Court held in the Moore decision that 
the trial court should have given an instruction substantially 
similar to Instruction No. 25. 
ARGUMENT III 
C.S.B. IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO RULE 
33, RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The present appeal is Petitioner's third attempt to reverse 
the jury's verdict. The trial court denied Petitioner's motion 
for a new trial and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court. Petitioner's repeated attempts to overturn the jury 
verdict are made despite the well-established concept that "[a] 
party claiming that the evidence does not support a jury's 
verdict carries a heavy burden." Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 
766, 769 (Utah 1985). In this case Petitioner seeks an 
extraordinary writ to reverse the jury verdict. However, 
Petitioner does not cite any dispositive legal authority or 
undisputed facts which would entitle her to such relief. Indeed, 
Petitioner's alleged rights depend upon technical and strained 
interpretations of authority, despite rejection of these same 
arguments by the lower courts in reliance upon the same 
authority. 
Rule 33(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, provides that 
the Court may award just damages, including reasonable attorney's 
fees when "a motion made or an appeal taken under these rules is 
either frivolous or for delay...." The present Petition for Writ 
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of Certiorari is necessarily either for delay or frivolous. 
However, as the Court of Appeals noted fl[w]hile it may be 
possible to determine when an action is taken for delay, the 
question of what is a frivolous appeal is more difficult." 
O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App. 1987). 
The Court of Appeals noted that in Cady v. Johnson 671 P.2d 
149, 151 (Utah 1983), the Court defined frivolous within the 
meaning of Rule 33, as those matters "without merit." However, 
something more than a showing that an appeal was without merit 
was required or a "loser pay" situation would result. Moreover, 
the Respondent was not obligated to show that the appeal 
evidenced an absence of good faith, although such a strict 
showing is the trial court standard. Consequently, the Court of 
Appeals sought guidance from Rule 40(a), Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals, which provides, in pertinent part, that the signature 
of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that to the 
best of the attorney's or party's knowledge, information and 
belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, the brief, motion or 
other paper signed is well grounded in fact and is warranted by 
existing law. 
The Court of Appeals found the definition in Rule 40(a) 
controlling on the grounds that the definition was sufficiently 
objective that it could be applied without delving into the 
parties' subjective intent and the lesser appellate standard was 
justified because "the decision to appeal should be reached only 
after careful consideration by the party and counsel." O'Brien 
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v. Rush, 744 P.2d at 310. Rule 40(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, is virtually identical to Rule 40(a), Rules of the court 
of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals ruling should be controlling 
herein. Petitioner's successive appeals prejudice C.S.B. and the 
reduced appellate standard for a frivolous appeal was intended to 
protect entities such as C.S.B. from the endless delay and 
considerable expense unfairly imposed upon respondents by 
frivolous appeals. The frivolous nature of this Petition is 
demonstrated by Petitioner's contention that sufficient grounds 
exist for a Writ based upon cases extensively cited by the Court 
of Appeals to affirm the jury verdict. Furthermore, Petitioner 
has failed to acknowledge that she must meet a very heavy burden 
to overturn a jury verdict, especially where the verdict has 
already been affirmed by the trial court and appellate court. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner's qualified, conditional and ambiguous assertion 
that certain Utah Supreme Court cases seem to indicate a 
different duty of care than that implied in Instruction No. 25 is 
an insufficient ground for this Court to exercise its discretion 
and review the case and constitutes a failure to accurately 
present points essential for consideration of the petition. 
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court decisions cited by 
Petitioner do not conflict with the published opinion of the 
Court of Appeals. In Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. , 
Jacobsen Construction Co., Inc. v. Structo-Lite Engineering, 
Inc. , and Stephens v. Henderson, the Court described an injured 
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party's duty of care and ruled that instructions on both 
assumption of risk and contributory negligence were proper where 
the contributory negligence instructions, when read as a whole, 
require the jury to apportion negligence if both parties were 
found to have acted negligently. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court 
decisions were relied upon by the Court of Appeals as the 
primary authority to affirm the jury verdict. Instruction No. 25 
was a correct statement of Petitioner's duty of care when read 
with the other contributory negligence instructions. 
Finally, the Petitioner has made three frivolous attempts to 
reverse the jury's verdict which has wasted judicial resources, 
resulted in considerable £elay and prejudiced C.S.B. 
Proceedings before the trial court require a showing that 
Plaintiff's actions lacked good faith. However, a lesser 
standard governs the decision to appeal. In particular, the 
decision to appeal must be formed after reasonable inquiry and be 
well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law. 
Petitioner's dilatory and frivolous appeal is in direct 
contravention of Rule 33, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Petitioner's reliance on Utah Supreme Court decisions extensively 
cited by the Court of Appeals is patently insufficient to meet 
the heavy burden Petitioner has to satisfy to overturn a jury 
verdict. 
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Therefore, C.S.B. respectfully requests that the petition 
for Writ of Certiorari be denied and C.S.B. be awarded its 
attorney fees herein. 
DATED this tt iy day of February, 1988. 
CL (•- ^ '-\\ - j k : _ 
Donatd J . P u r s e r , Esq . 
J . Angus Edwarirds, Esq . 
PURSER, OVERHOLT & OKAZAKI, P.C. 
39 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent/Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 
—lib 
day of February, 1988, I 
caused a true and correct copy of BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI to be served upon the following 
by depositing copies thereof in the United States mails, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Robert A. Echard 
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD 
635-25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 844 01 
Attorney for Petitioner/Plaintiff 
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APPENDIX 
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Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery 
of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If the court shall determine 
that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for 
delay, it shall award just damages and single or double costs, including rea-
sonable attorney's fees, to the prevailing party. 
(b) Disciplinary action for inadequate representation. The court may 
take appropriate disciplinary action against counsel who inadequately repre-
sents his client on appeal. 
Rule 43. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discre-
tion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons 
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the 
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of this 
court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled 
by this court. 
Rule 40, Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and 
discipline. 
(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every motion, brief, and other paper 
of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney 
of record who is an active member in good standing of the bar of this court, in 
his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not repre-
sented by an attorney shall sign his motion, brief, or other paper and state his 
address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, mo-
tions, briefs, or other papers need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he 
has read the motion, brief, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, 
information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in 
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the exten-
sion, modification, or reversal of existing law; and that it is not interposed for 
anY improper purposes, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or need-
less increase in the cost of litigation. If a motion, brief, or other paper is not 
Slgned as required by this rule, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly 
*fter the omission is called to the attention of the attorney or party. If a 
Motion, brief, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon 
Motion or sua sponte, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a repre-
*£ted party, or both an appropriate sanction, which may include dismissal or 
**^nnance of the appeal, sanctions and discipline under Paragraph (b) of this 
*^
e> or an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reason-
*^
e
 expenses incurred because of the filing of the motion, brief, or other 
Per> including a reasonable attorney fee. 
lb) Sanctions and discipline of attorneys and parties. The court may, 
"*
r
 reasonable notice and an opportunity to show cause to the contrary, and 
^ °
n
 hearing, if requested, take appropriate action against any attorney or 
p^°n who practices before it for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar or 
Jj 0 n allowed to appear before the court, or for failure to comply with these 
^ of the court or order of the court. Any action to suspend or disbar a 
Corn* °^ ^ e Utah State Bar shall be referred to the Ethics and Discipline 
bisr,rril^ee °^ ^ e State Bar for proceedings in accordance with the Rules of 
^ P l i n e of the State Bar. 
^ ^
u te does not affect contempt power. This rule shall not be con-
(d) A"° ^ m ^ o r impair the court's inherent and statutory contempt powers. 
^ A p p e a r a n c e of counsel pro hac vice. An attorney who is licensed to 
**itihCe ^e^0re tke b a r °f a s i s t e r state or a foreign country but who is not a 
l^ l e r of the bar of this court may appear, upon motion, pro hac vice. Such 
^ i ey shall have associated with him an active member in good standing of 
*i*er r °^  this court and shall be subject to the provisions of this rule and all 
^les of appellate procedure. 
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Rule 46 RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
(C) reliance upon Rule 44(c), where a cross-petition for a writ of 
certiorari is filed, stating the filing date of the petition for a writ of 
certiorari in connection with which the cross-petition is filed; and 
(D) the statutory provision believed to confer on this court jurisdic-
tion to review the decision in question by a writ of certiorari. 
(7) Controlling provisions of constitutions, statutes, ordinances, and 
regulations that the case involves, setting them out verbatim and giving 
the appropriate citation therefor. If the controlling provisions involved 
are lengthy, their citation alone will suffice at this point and their perti-
nent text shall be set forth in the appendix referred to in Subparagraph 
(10) of this paragraph. 
(8) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly 
the nature of the case, the course of the proceedings, and its disposition in 
the lower courts. There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to 
the issues presented for review. All statements of fact and references to 
the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record before 
and to the opinion of the Court of Appeals. 
(9) With respect to each question presented, a direct and concise argu-
ment for the issuance of the writ. (See Rule 43.) 
(10) An appendix containing, in the following order: 
(A) copies of all opinions, including concurring and dissenting 
opinions, and all orders, including any order on rehearing, delivered 
by the Court of Appeals in rendering the decision sought to be re-
viewed; 
(B)- copies of any other opinions, findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
orders, judgments, or decrees that were rendered in the case or in 
companion cases by the Court of Appeals and by other courts or by 
administrative agencies and that are relevant to the questions pre-
sented (each of those documents shall include the caption showing 
the name of the issuing court or agency, the title and number of the 
case, and the date of its entry); and 
(C) any other judicial or administrative opinions or orders that are 
relevant to the questions presented but were not entered in the case 
that is the subject of the petition. 
If the material that is required by Subparagraphs (7) and (10) of this para-
graph is voluminous, such may, if more convenient, be separately presented. 
(b) Form of petition. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall comply with 
the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27(a)(l)-(3), except that the cover of the 
petition shall be white. The clerk shall examine all petitions before filing, and 
if a petition is not prepared in accordance with Rule 27(a)(D-(3) and this 
paragraph, it will not be filed, but shall be returned to be properly prepared. 
(c) No separate brief. All contentions in support of a petition for a writ of 
certiorari shall be set forth in the body of the petition, as provided in Subpara-
graph (a) (9) of this rule. No separate brief in support of a petition for a writ of 
certiorari will be received, and the clerk will refuse to file any petition for a 
writ of certiorari to which is annexed or appended any supporting brief. 
(d) Page limitation. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall be as short as 
possible, but may not exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the table 
of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Subparagraph (a)(7) of 
this rule, and the appendix. 
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RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT Rule 47 
(e) Absence of accuracy, brevity, and clarity. The failure of a petitioner 
to present with accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to a ready 
and adequate understanding of the points requiring consideration will be a 
sufficient reason for denying the petition. 
(Enacted effective April 20, 1987.) 
Rule 47. Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of amicus 
curiae. 
(a) Brief in opposition. The respondent shall have 30 days (unless en-
larged by the court pursuant to Rule 22(b)) after service of a petition in which 
to file ten copies of an opposing brief, disclosing any matter or ground why the 
case should not be reviewed by this court. Such brief shall comply with the 
requirements of Rule 46, as applicable, and comply with the form of a brief as 
specified in Rule 27(a)(l)-(3), except that the cover of the brief shall be orange. 
The clerk shall examine all briefs before filing, and if a brief is not prepared in 
accordance with Rule 27(a)(l)-(3) and with the proper cover, it will not be 
filed, but shall be returned to be properly prepared. Four copies of the brief 
shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party separately 
represented. 
(b) Page limitation. A brief in opposition shall be as short as possible and 
may not, in any single case, exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the 
table of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Rule 46(a)(7), and 
the appendix. 
(c) Objections to jurisdiction. No motion by a respondent to dismiss a 
petition for a writ of certiorari will be received. Objections to the jurisdiction 
of the court to grant the writ of certiorari may be included in the brief in 
opposition. 
(d) Distribution of filings. Upon the filing of a brief in opposition, the 
expiration of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file, 
the petition and the brief, if any, will be distributed by the clerk to the court 
for consideration. However, if a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari has been 
filed, distribution of both it and the petition for a writ of certiorari will be 
delayed until the filing of a brief in opposition by the cross-respondent, the 
expiration of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file. 
(e) Reply brief. A reply brief addressed to arguments first raised in the 
brief in opposition may be filed by any petitioner, but distribution under 
paragraph (d) hereof will not be delayed pending the filing of any such brief. 
Such brief shall be as short as possible, but may not exceed five pages. Such 
brief shall comply with the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27(a)(l)-(3), 
except that the cover of the brief shall be yellow. The clerk shall examine all 
briefs before filing, and if a brief is not prepared in accordance with Rule 
27(a)(l)-(3) and with the proper cover, it will not be filed, but shall be returned 
to be properly prepared. Ten copies of the brief shall be filed, and four copies 
shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party separately 
represented. 
(f) Brief of amicus curiae. A brief of an amicus curiae may be filed only if 
accompanied by written consent of all parties, by leave of the court granted on 
potion, or at the request of the court. A motion for leave shall identify the 
interest of the applicant and shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus 
curiae is desirable. Except as all parties otherwise consent, an amicus curiae 
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RULES OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS Rule 40 
Rule 39, Duties of the clerk. 
(a) General provisions. The office of the clerk, with the clerk or a deputy 
in attendance, shall be open during business hours on all days except Satur-
days, Sundays, and legal holidays. 
(b) The docket; calendar; other records required. The clerk shall keep 
a record, known as the docket, in form and style as may be prescribed by the 
court and shall enter therein each case. The number of each case shall be 
noted on the page of the docket whereon the first entry is made. All papers 
filed with the clerk and all process, orders, and opinions shall be entered 
chronologically in the docket on the pages assigned to the case. Entries shall 
be brief but shall show the nature of each paper filed or decision or order 
entered and the date thereof. The clerk shall keep a suitable index of cases 
contained in the docket. 
The clerk shall keep a minute book in which shall be entered a record of the 
daily proceedings of the court. The clerk shall prepare, under the direction of 
the presiding judge, a calendar of cases awaiting argument. In placing cases 
on the calendar for argument, the clerk shall give preference to appeals in 
criminal cases and to appeals and other proceedings entitled to preference by 
law. 
(c) Notice of orders. Immediately upon the entry of an order or a decision, 
the clerk shall serve a notice of entry by mail upon each party to the proceed-
ing, together with a copy of any opinion respecting the order or decision, and 
shall make a note in the docket of the mailing. Service on a party represented 
by counsel shall be made upon counsel. 
(d) Custody of records and papers. The clerk shall have custody of the 
records and papers of the court. The clerk shall not permit any original record 
or paper to be taken from the clerk's custody, except as authorized by these 
rules or the orders or instructions of the court. Original papers transmitted as 
the record on appeal or review shall upon disposition of the case be returned to 
the court or agency from which they were received. The clerk shall preserve 
copies of briefs and attachments, as well as other printed papers filed. 
Rule 40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and 
discipline, 
(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every motion, brief, and other paper 
°f a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by a* least one attorney 
°f record who is an active member in good standing of the bar of the Supreme 
Court of Utah. The attorney shall sign his or her individual name and give his 
0r
 her business address. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall 
8
*gn every motion, brief, and other paper and state the party's address. Except 
^hen otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, motions, briefs, or 
°ther papers need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature 
°f an attorney or a party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or the 
Party has read the motion, brief, or other paper; that to the best of the attor-
ney's or the party's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reason-
able inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a 
S°od faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
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law; and that it is not interposed for any improper purposes, such as to har 
or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If 
motion, brief, or other paper is not signed as required by this rule, it shall h!! 
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the atten 
tion of the attorney or the party. If a motion, brief, or other paper is signed i * 
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or sua sponte, shall impose up0n 
the person who signed it, a represented party, or both an appropriate sanction 
which may include dismissal or affirmance of the appeal, sanctions and disci! 
pline under Paragraph (b) of this rule, or an order to pay to the other party
 0r 
parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing
 0f 
the motion, brief, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney fee. 
(b) Sanctions and discipline of attorneys and parties. The court may 
after reasonable notice and an opportunity to show cause to the contrary and 
upon hearing, if requested, take appropriate action against any attorney or 
person who practices before it for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar or 
a person allowed to appear before the court or for failure to comply with these 
rules of the court or order of the court. Any action to suspend or disbar a 
member of the Utah State Bar shall be referred to the Ethics and Discipline 
Committee of the state bar for proceedings in accordance with the Rules of 
Discipline of the State Bar. 
(c) Rule does not affect contempt power. This rule shall not be con-
strued to limit or impair the court's inherent and statutory contempt powers. 
(d) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. An attorney who is licensed to 
practice before the bar of a sister state or a foreign country but who is not a 
member of the bar of the Supreme Court of Utah may appear, upon motion 
pro hac vice. Such attorney shall be associated with an active member in good 
standing of the bar of this court and shall be subject to the provisions of this 
rule and all other provisions of these rules. 
Index to 
3MINISTRATIVE AGENCIE 
COMMISSIONS AND COM 
[Costs. 
Agency appeals, Rule 34 
fjleview and enforcement of < 
Agencies 
Duty to file record, Rule 16 
U Applicability of other rules tc 
Rule 18 
Dockets 
Docketing fees, Rule 14. 
Fees. 
Docketing fees, Rule 14 
Statutory fees, Rule 14. 
Filing. 
Record on review, Rule 16. 
Intervention, Rule 14 
Notice. 
Record on review 
Filing, Rule 16. 
Petition for review 
Contents, Rule 14. 
Filing. 
Time, Rule 14. 
Joint petition, Rule 14. 
Service, Rule 14. 
Time. 
Filing, Rule 14. 
Record on review. 
Agencies. 
Duty to file, Rule 16. 
Composition, Rule 15. 
Filing. 
Duty of agency, Rule 16 
Notice, Rule 16. 
Time for, Rule 16 
What constitutes, Rule ] 
Misstatements, Rule 15. 
Notice. 
Filing, Rule 16. 
Omissions, Rule 15. 
Service. 
Petition for review, Rule 1 
AMICUS CURIAE. 
- Briefs of, Rule 25. 
ANSWERS. 
Discretionary appeals. 
Interlocutory orders, Rule 5. 
Filing, Rule 5 
Habeas corpus. 
Contents, Rule 20. 
510 
372 lTt j lh <>™ PACIFIC RFPORTKR, 2d SKKIKS 
Willis E. ROSENLOF and Linna G. Ro-
senlof, his wife. Plaintiffs, Respon-
dents and Cross-Appellants, 
v. 
Ned L. SULLIVAN and the City of St. 
George, Defendants, Third-Party Plain-
tiff, Appellant and Cross-Respondent, 
v. 
Ben STOUT dba Ben Stout Realty and 
Kent Frei, Third-Party Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. 18108. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 12, 1983. 
After city informed purchasers of 
home that it could not be used as duplex-
under zoning laws, although so construct-
ed, purchasers brought action against ven-
dor, claiming that he had misrepresented 
property as duplex, and vendor cross-
claimed against real estate agent who had 
arranged sale. The Fifth District Court, 
Washington County, Robert F. Owens, Cir-
cuit Judge, by designation, entered judg-
ment against vendor for both damages and 
attorney fees, and both vendor and pur-
chasers appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Stewart, J., held that: (1) in light of nature 
of claim and evidence presented at trial, 
trial court properly instructed jury on 
breach of contract, notwithstanding that 
purchasers did not specifically raise con-
tract claim in complaint; (2) trial court did 
not err in refusing to grant new trial for 
jury's alleged mathematical error in award-
ing damages; (3) vendor could not claim 
error as to trial court's response to jury's 
request for additional instructions which 
was approved by all parties; (4) purchasers 
were entitled to attorney fees, including 
those incurred on appeal; and (5) purchas-
ers were not entitled to further damage 
award to compensate them for cost of con-
verting duplex to single-family rental. 
Judgment r^ffirmed; ca^o remanded 
1. Appeal and Error e=>173(l) 
Failure of vendor, in trial of purchas-
ers' action alleging his misrepresentation in 
sale of house, to raise issue of whether real 
estate agent might also have been agent of 
purchasers precluded Supreme Court from 
addressing such issue on appeal. 
2. Trial <3=>252(13) 
Where nub of purchasers' action 
alleging that vendor misrepresented prop-
erty as duplex was contract between par-
ties, evidence at trial established contract, 
and specific issues alleged by purchasers 
under broad allegation of fraud were es-
sentially coterminous with elements of 
breach of contract, trial court properly in-
structed jury concerning breach of con-
tract, notwithstanding that contract claim 
was not specifically framed in complaint. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 8(a), 15(b). 
3. New Trial e=»143(5) 
Trial court properly refused to grant 
new trial on basis of affidavit by jury fore-
man which stated that jury made mathe-
matical error in awarding damages, as jur-
or was allowed to impeach a verdict only 
when it was determined by chance or brib-
ery. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(2). 
4. Appeal and Error <3=>883 
Where, upon jury request for addition-
al instructions, trial court consulted all par-
ties, and they agreed to response given by 
trial court, defendant could not on appeal 
allege error as to response given. 
5. Costs <3>172, 252 
Where purchasers of house, in action 
premised upon vendor's misrepresentations 
in sale of house, sufficiently alleged breach 
of earnest money agreement and presented 
sufficient evidence to sustain jury finding 
of breach of contract, prevailing purchas-
ers were entitled to attorney fees, including 
those fees incurred on appeal. 
6. Fraud <£>60 
Where jury, in purchasers' act" n 
alleging that vendor of house miM"p»*e-tn-
ted property as duplex, returned verdict 
against vendor for difference between \al-
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ue of property as single-family dwelling 
rental home and value of property as two-
family rental home, purchasers were not 
entitled to further damage award to com-
pensate for cost of converting duplex to 
single-family rental. 
Maxwell Bentley. Mark C. McLachlan, 
Salt Lake City, for defendants, third party 
plaintiff, appellant and cross-respondent. 
John L. Miles, St. George, for plaintiffs, 
respondents and cross-appellants. 
STEWART. Justice: 
This is an appeal and cross appeal from a 
jury verdict in a case involving a real estate 
transaction. We affirm the jury verdict 
and remand to the district court for a deter-
mination of reasonable attorney's fees on 
this appeal. 
Ned Sullivan, the defendant and the sell-
er of the real estate in dispute, purchased 
property in. St. George, Utah, and obtained 
a building permit for the construction of a 
single family dwelling. He commenced 
construction of a duplex even though he 
knew that the size of the property was too 
small for a duplex under the zoning laws. 
During the construction, Kent Frei, a real 
estate agent and a third-party defendant 
and respondent on this appeal, talked with 
the defendant about obtaining a listing on 
the property. The defendant refused to 
list the property but stated that he would 
consider a one-party listing if Mr. Frei had 
a specific buyer. When the duplex was 
finished, the defendant's two married sons 
rented the separate units. 
A year after Frei's conversation with the 
defendant, Frei talked with the Rosenlofs, 
his aunt and uncle, about finding them 
some income property in St. George. The 
Rosenlofs are the plaintiffs. Frei then con-
tacted the defendant and obtained a one-
party listing. The defendant claims that 
during this time he told Frei that the prop-
erty could not be represented as a duplex, 
even though he later signed a document, 
written by Frei, which referred to the prop-
erty as a duplex. Frei denies the assertion 
. SULLIVAN Utah 3 7 3 
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that he was told the property could not be 
represented as a duplex. Nevertheless, 
Frei knew that the property was too small 
for a duplex, but he assumed, without 
checking, that the defendant had obtained 
a variance. Subsequently, the plaintiffs 
inspected the property. At that time the 
duplex was occupied and there was no 
stairway from the top unit to the lower 
unit. 
The plaintiffs signed an earnest money 
receipt and offer to purchase, and the de-
fendant accepted the offer. Frei acted as 
an intermediary during the negotiations, 
and thus the plaintiffs never actually met 
the defendant. Neither the earnest money 
receipt nor the listing indicated that the 
property was a duplex. 
After purchasing the property, the plain-
tiffs continued to rent to the defendant's 
sons. Five months later one of the sons 
moved out. When the new tenant went to 
the city utility department to change the 
billing, the city informed the plaintiffs that 
the property could not be used as a duplex. 
The plaintiffs immediately applied for a 
variance, but the application was denied. 
Furthermore, it was impossible to purchase 
more 'and to bring the property into com-
pliance with the zoning. 
After failing to obtain a variance, the 
plaintiffs brought this action against the 
defendant claiming that the defendant had 
misrepresented the property as a duplex. 
The plaintiffs asked for the difference in 
the value of the property as a duplex and 
the value as a single dwelling home and for 
attorney's fees, as provided for in the ear-
nest money agreement. 
The defendant cross-claimed against the 
real estate agent Frei and his broker Ben 
Stout. The defendant claimed that Frei 
had exceeded his authority in representing 
the property as a duplex and that he had 
breached his obligation to the plaintiffs by 
not checking the records to make sure the 
property could be lawfully used as a du-
plex, when Frei knew the property was too 
small for such use. 
3 7 ! iTt^ii *;:« P U ' I F K 1 R E P O R T E R , 2d S E R I E S 
The jury returned a verdict against the 
defendant for $18,000, the difference be-
tween the value of the property as a single 
family dwelling rental home and the value 
of the property as a two family rental 
home. Plaintiffs were also awarded $4,000 
attorney's fees. 
On appeal, the defendant argues that a 
new trial should be granted because the 
evidence and law do not support a finding 
that the plaintiffs reasonably relied on the 
representation that the property was a du-
plex. The defendant argues that the plain-
tiffs could not reasonably have relied upon 
the false representation because (1) Frei 
knew the lot was too small for a duplex; (2) 
Frei was actually the plaintiffs' agent, not 
the defendant's (or Frei was a dual agent 
for both the plaintiffs and defendant); (3) 
Frei should not have assumed a variance 
had been obtained, (4) as plaintiffs' agent, 
Frei had a luty to lmestigate the matter 
himself and disclose to the plaintiffs the 
smallness of the lot and the results of his 
investigation; (a) the plaintiffs are bound 
bv Fivfs ':nowledtre, omi^Mons and negli-
gence because of V\ \\ failure to do so; 
and (6) plamtiffs had no right to relv on the 
i dse representations because Frei's knowl-
edge was imputed to the plaintiffs 
Ker to all these contentions is the d^-
iendant's theorv that Fnn was an agent of 
the buyers (the plaintiffs!, even if he were 
also an agent of the seller (the defendant). 
Mthowh there was some evidence to sup-
port the theory that Frei wis an agent for 
the buyers, the defendant did not propose 
an instruction on that theory. The defend-
ant objected only to three instructions 
which focused solely on an agency relation-
ship between Frei and the seller. 
[1] The failure of tl e defendant to raise 
in the trial court the issue of whether Frei 
might also have been an agent of the buy-
ers precludes us from addressing that issue 
on appeal. E.g., Park City Utah Corp. v. 
Ensign Co, Utah, 5S6 P 2d 446 (1978); In 
re Estate of Ekker, 19 Utah 2d 414, 432 
P 2d 45 (1967) 
[2] The defendant next argues that the 
trial court erred by instructinc: the jury 
that 
[i]f you find that the existing \ iolation of 
the St. George City Zoning Ordinance 
renders the title to the property unmark-
etable as a duplex, and if you also find 
that the property was represented as a 
duplex, then the Seller has breached his 
agreement in the Earnest Mone\ to con-
vey marketable title and [is] answerable 
in damages, including attorne\ \ fees. 
He contends that the instruction is errone-
ous because the plaintiffs only alleged 
fraud in their complaint and not breach of 
contract. 
Under Utah R.Civ.P. 8(a), " 'a pleader is 
required only to make a short and plain 
statement of his claim.' " Blackham v. 
Snelgrove, 3 Utah 2d 157, 160, 2S0 P.2d 
453, 454 (1955), quoting Burr v. Child*, 1 
Utah 2d 199, 204, 265 P 2d 3S3, 3^7 (1953). 
"[A] complaint is required only to 4 * 
give the opposing paity fair notice of the 
nature and basis or grounds of the claim 
and a general ind:cation of th** t \pe of 
litigation involved.' " Id. 3 TTtah 2d at 160, 
^ 0 P2d at 455, quoting 1 Barron cv Holt-
/otf, federal Practice and Pujcedui' 
*> 255 at 431-34 (1960) The parties at* 
"on^Med to . . . nonce of the issues rai^d 
and an opportunity to meet them ' Che 
neu r. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205 211, 3M 
P >i> Ni 91 (1963) See also \\tlha,>< < 
St •*" Farm Insurance Co, Utah. t>~<' p JM 
J' ' °70-71 (1982> which d iscuses Hl„cl> 
tuiPK Uurr, and ' hei>ey. 
\hhough the of nntiffs did nof aPege 
breach of contract claim in their conusant 
th< nub of the whole litigation was th^ 
contract between the parties Indeed, the 
comprint alleged; 
[Tjhe Plaintiffs made an offer to huv tV»^ 
luplex on August 27, 1979 and . *aid 
offer was accepter by Ned L Sullivan on 
September 3, 1979. Attached to th'* 
complaint as Exhibit "A" is a copy of the 
"Earnest Mone\ Receipt and Offer To 
Purchase" which sets forth the agree-
ment between the parties and which is 
incorporated herem by this reference 
"OSENTOF v 
Clio :is 67d l\2<l 
. . . Defendant Ned L. Sullivan should 
be required to pav Plaintifrs damages of 
$40,000 or such other amount as may be 
proved at trial for the difference between 
the value of the property as a single 
family rental home and the value of the 
property if it had been a duplex rental as 
represented, said difference being the 
Plaintiffs loss of the benefit of their bar-
gain. 
. . . Defendant Ned L. Sullivan should 
be required to pay Plaintiffs reasonable 
attorney fees as provided by lines 47-48 
of Exhibit "A" [the Earnest Money Re-
ceipt and Offer to Purchase] in such 
amount as may be proved at trial. 
Even though a contract claim was not 
adequately framed in the complaint, Utah 
R.Civ.P. 15(b) permits a complaint to be 
amended "at any time, even after judg-
ment," to conform with the evidence. The 
evidence at trial established the contract, 
the intent of the parties regarding the con-
tract, and the defendant's breach of the 
contract. No objection was made by the 
defendant to any of this evidence. The 
defendant had ample opportunity to 
present evidence showing that there was 
no breach. Moreover, the specific issues 
alleged under the broad allegation of fraud 
were essentially coterminous with the ele-
ments of breach of contract, except per-
haps as to whether Frei was a dual agent. 
Nevertheless, that was a central point in 
Sullivan's case on either theory. On this 
appeal, defendant points to no defenses he 
would or could have presented on the con-
tract issue had a contract case been proper-
ly pleaded. Nor does defendant showr prej-
udice of any kind. 
[3] The defendant also argues that the 
trial court erred in not granting a new trial 
because the jury allegedly made a mathe-
matical error in awarding damages. The 
jury foreman stated in an affidavit filed in 
support of defendant's motion for new tri-
al, that: 
fljn determining the amount of damages 
to be awarded the plaintiffs against the 
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defendant Ned L. Sullivan, a mistake* 
was made in the sum of five thousand 
dollars. This resulted from the mistaken 
suggestion that the difference between 
the value of the house as a duplex and as 
a single-family residence was $18,000.00, 
which was arrived [atj by deducting the 
value of a single-family residence of .>f>5,-
000 from the value of the property as a 
duplex winch was $78,000.00. 
. . . Shortly after the erroneous verdict 
was given to the Court, I realized that an 
error had been made and I contacted my 
attorney, . . . and I requested that he 
communicate the information to the re-
spective attorneys and/or parties in-
volved, which was done. 
Rule 59(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure authorizes a jury verdict to be 
impeached by the affidavit of a juror based 
on certain narrowly defined grounds of 
jury misconduct. This Court has interpret-
ed Rule 59(a)(2) to allow an affidavit by a 
juror to impeach the verdict only when the 
verdict was determined by chance or brib-
ery. Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, Utah, 667 P.2d 
598 (1983); Smith v. Baniett, 17 Utah 2d 
240, 408 P.2d 709 (1965). See Johnson v. 
Simons, Utah, 551 P.2d 515 (1976); String-
ham v. Broderick, Utah, 529 P.2d 425 
(1974). 
The reasons for limiting the circumstanc-
es when a juror's affidavit may be used to 
impeach his verdict were explained in 
Wheat v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., . 122 
Utah 418, 428-29, 250 P.2d 932, 937 (1952): 
To permit litigants to get jurors to sign 
affidavits or testify to matters discussed 
in connection with their functions as jur-
ors would open the door to inquiry into 
all manner of things which a losing liti-
gant might consider improper: miscon-
ceptions of evidence or law, offers of 
settlement, personal experiences, preju-
dice against litigants or their causes or 
the classes to which they belong. It 
would be an interminable and totally im-
practicable process. Such post mortems 
would be productive of no end of mis-
chief and render service as a juror un-
bearable. If jurors were so circum-
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scribed in their deliberations, it is likely 
that judge and counsel would have to be 
present in the jury room attempting to 
monitor and regulate their thought and 
discussions into approved channels. For-
tunately, jurors are under no such limita-
tion, but are allowed freedom in their 
deliberations. 
[41 The defendant also argues that the 
trial court erred in denying his motion for a 
new trial for failing to give the jury addi-
tional instructions after it transmitted the 
following question to the trial judge: 
If we conclude that there has been 
negligence on both parties, Ned Sullivan 
and Ben Stout Realty, can we divide the 
liability between the defendants in each 
case? 
The response formulated to the above 
question was: 
The question seems to relate to the 
second case. Under the legal theory in-
volved in the second case, you should not 
divide liability, but shouid find for one or 
the other. Perhaps a re-reading of your 
instructions and verd'jts would assist 
you. 
The defendant, for the first time on ap-
peal, argues that the trial court should 
have given an instruction rent ing to com-
parative negl'gence. In determining how 
to respond to the jury's question, the trial 
court consulted all the parties, and they 
agreed to the above response. Defendant's 
contention is meritless. 
151 Of1 fondant's final contention is that 
the trial court erred in instructing the jury 
that under the earnest money contract, the 
prevailing party would be entitled to attor-
ney's fees. Since we have already decided 
that the plaintiffs did allege breach of the 
earnest money agreement and presented 
sufficient evidence to sustain a jury finding 
of breach of contract, the plaintiffs are 
entitled to attorney's fees. 
Plaintiffs seek reasonable attorney's fees 
expended for this appeal. In recent cases 
we have adopted as a "rule of law that a 
contract provision for payment of attor-
ney's fees includes attorney's fees incurred 
on appeal as well as at trial, if the action is 
brought to enforce the contract . . . . " 
Management Services Corp. v. Develop-
ment Associates, Utah, GIT P.2d 40b, 409 
(1980). Accord Alexander v. Brown, Utah, 
646 P.2d 692 (1982); Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien 
Wang, Utah, 613 P.2d f)12 (1980). See also 
Edwards' Pet Supply v. Ben f lei/, Utah, 
652 P.2d 889, 890 (1982). Accordingly, we 
remand for a determination of reasonable 
attorney's fees for this appeal. 
[61 The plaintiffs also claim that the 
damage award should be increased by 
$4,027.00 to compensate the plaintiffs for 
the cost of converting the duplex to a sin-
gle family rental. The jury verdict is dis-
positive of the damage claims in this case. 
The judgment is affirmed and the case 
remanded to the trial court for a determi-
nation of reasonable attorney's fees on ap-
peal. Costs to respondents. 
HAUL, C.J., and OAKS, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Joseph Scott HAMRLIN, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 1S705. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 13, 1983. 
Defendant was convicted in the Second 
District Court, Weber County, Ronald 0. 
Hyde. J., of automobile homicide. Defend-
ant appealed. The Supreme Court, Dur-
ham, J., held that: (1) under rule that spe-
"ifL- statute controls general one, and in 
view of primary responsibility of court to 
DEATS v. COMMERCIAL SEC. BANK 
Cite a* 746 P2d 1191 (Utah App. 1987) 
Utah H 9 1 
\bcock and Brown, 
k and Brown filed 
amended complaints. 
I an order of consoli-
> stipulation, on Octo-
[985, more than two 
r plaintiffs amended 
Kelly filed a motion 
int to include as de-
ld Brown. After a 
r 23, 1985, the court 
elly argues the trial 
r her motion to amend 
R.Civ.P. 15(a) states: 
:1 his pleading once as 
at any time before a 
y is served or, if the 
which no responsive 
od and the action has 
jon the trial calendar, 
t at any time within 20 
ved. Otherwise a par-
pleading only by 'leave 
•ihten consent of the 
d leave shall be freely 
e so requires, 
motion to amend, the 
do "whether the oppos-
it to unavoidable preju-
issue adjudicated for 
10 to prepare." Bckins 
t,th, 1>(U P.2d 45o, 464 
it a clear abuse of dis-
will not disturb a trial 
motion to amend. Gir-
0 P.2d 24"> tLtah 1«S3). 
s the amendment would 
udice to Bubcock and 
ey were aware of her 
.n two years and partici-
by attending her deposi-
iey attended plaintiffs 
c and Brown did not par-
r their own questions. 
: an action against other 
require a defendant to 
in anticipation of plain-
;ome future time to join 
rtv. See Randall v. Sal-
vation Army, 100 Nev. 4?1G, 686 P.2d 241 
(1984) (consolidation does not necessarily 
render litigants parties to each other's 
suits). 
The case had been pending for over three 
years when, just prior to trial, Mrs. Kelly 
moved to amend her complaint. A hearing 
on the motion was held one week before 
trial was set to begin. Babcock and Brown 
were prepared to defend against five per-
sonal injury claims. That does not mean 
they could be required to defend, on short 
notice, a wrongful death action of a differ-
ent plaintiff. If the trial court had granted 
the motion so close to trial, it may have 
required a continuance of the trial which, in 
turn, could have prejudiced the consolidat-
ed cases. 
We conclude the trial court acted within 
its discretion in denying Mrs. Kelly's mo-
tion to amend. The court's order is af-
firmed. Costs to Babcock and Brown. 
BILLINGS and GREENr 
concur. 
ODD, JJ., 
V r v>*.
;
-W', ' 
Cindy HEATS, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY HANK, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 8f>n:]22~CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 15, 1987. 
Patron brought action against owner 
of parking terrace for injuries sustained 
when she slipped on ice on parking terrace. 
The Second District Court, Weber County, 
David E. Roth, J., found that owner was 
not negligent, and patron appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held that: (1) 
finding that owner was not negligent wras 
supported by evidence that patron knew 
that uncovered level of parking terrace was 
icy, patron was not required to park on 
uncovered level, and patron was first pa-
tron to arrive at parking terrace that day, 
and (2) instruction that patron had duty to 
foresee plainly visible danger and avoid it 
was not improper. 
Affirmed. 
1. New Trial <S=>72(1) 
Jury's verdict which is subject of mo-
tion for new trial will be reversed only if 
evidence supporting it was completely lack-
ing or so slight and unconvincing as to 
make verdict plainly unreasonable and un-
just. 
2. Appeal and Error e=>930(l) 
Appellate court reviews jury's verdict 
in light most favorable to prevailing party, 
and accords evidence presented and every 
reasonable inference fairly drawn from evi-
dence same degree of deference. 
3. Negligence <s=>48 
In determining whether business invi-
tor w:\s negligent, inquiry is whether own-
er or its employees knew, or in exercise of 
ordinary care should have known, that dan-
gerous condition existed, and whether suf-
ficient time elapsed such that corrective 
action could have been taken to remedy 
situation. 
4. Negligence ®=»32(2.8) 
Property owners are not insurers for 
safety of their business invitees. 
5. Negligence <>^131(1) 
Finding that owner of parking terrace 
was not liable for injuries sustained when 
patron slipped in parking lot was supported 
by evidence that patron knew that parking 
terrace was icy, patron was not required to 
park on uncovered level of parking terrace, 
and patron was first patron of parking lot 
that day. 
6. Trial <3=>344 
Affidavit by juror may be used to im-
peach verdict only when verdict was deter-
mined by chance or bribery. Rules Civ. 
Proc, Rule 59(a)(2). 
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7. Trial c=>2*5, 295(1) 
Jury instructions are read in their en-
tire context and given meaning in accord-
ance with ordinary and usual import of 
language as it would be understood by Jay 
jurors. 
8. Negligence <3=67 
Plaintiff alleging negligence, acting in 
reasonably prudent manner, has duty to 
foresee danger, and to avoid it; if plaintiff 
fails to see or sees but fails to avoid dan-
ger, then plaintiff acted negligently. U.C. 
A. 1953, 78-27-37, 78-27-38. 
Robert A. Echard (argued), Gridley, Ech-
ard & Ward, Ogden, for plaintiff and appel-
lant. 
Donald J. Purser (argued), J. Angus Ed-
wards, Purser, Overhok & Okazaki, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and respondent. 
Before BILLINGS, GREENWOOD 
and BENCH, JJ. 
OPINION 
HU LINGS, Judge: 
. Plaintiff Cindy Deats '"Deats") appeals 
from a jury verdict that Commercial Securi-
ty oank ("CoB"') was not negligent in the 
maintenance <jf its parkin? terrace. Deats 
eiaims that the jury's verdict was contrary 
U> the evidence and manifestly unjust, and 
that a jury instruction misstated the law, 
constituting prejudicial error. We affirm. 
I.. 
FACTS 
At 7:05 a.m. on Monday, February 27, 
19v>i, Deats parked on the uncovered 
fourth level of a parking structure owned 
by CSB. Arriving before sunrise, Deats 
was the first patron of the parking lot 
After parking her car, Deats, while walk-
ing towards the exit stairway, decided to 
move her car because she thought another 
car might slide into it. While returning to 
move her car to a safer location, Deats 
slipped and fell on the ice, hurting her left 
knee. After she had moved her car, Deats 
observed a person throwing sand or salt on 
the previously unsanded parking surface. 
Deats filed a negligence action against CSB 
to recover for the personal injuries she 
sustained from the fall. 
The case was submitted to the jury after 
the trial judge read thirty-nine instructions, 
including instructions on comparative negli-
gence, the duty of care required of busi-
ness invitors, and the duty of care required 
of a plaintiff in a negligence action. 
The jury found that CSB was not negli-
gent. Deats subsequently filed a motion 
for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging: (1) 
the jury's verdict was contrary to the evi-
dence and manifestly unjust, and (2) in-
struction twenty-five was a misstatement 
of the law, constituting prejudicial error. 
The trial court denied Deats' motion for 
a new trial and this appeal ensued. 
II. 
THE JURY^ VERDICT 
11,2] A jury's verdict which is the sub-
ject of a motion for a new trial will be 
reversed only if the evidence supporting it 
We: ; completely lacking or so slight and 
unconvincing as to make ihe verdici plainly 
unreasonable and unjust. Royloncc v. 
Ru'ce, 737 P.2d 232. 284 (Utah Ct.App. 
lbr-'i). We review the jury's verdict in the 
light most favorable to the prevailing par-
ty, and accord the evidence presented and 
every reasonable inference fairly drawn 
from the evidence the same degree of def-
erence. Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 
172 (Utah 1983); sec Jacobsvn Construc-
tion Co. v. Strueto-Lite En pi nee ring. 
Inc.. 619 p.2d 306, *US (Utah Uisu). 
[3. I] In determining whether r busi-
ness invitor was negligent, the inquiry is 
whether the owner or its employees knew, 
or in the exercise of ordinary care should 
have known, that a dangerous condition 
existed, and whether sufficient time 
elapsed such that corrective action could 
have been taken to remedy the situation. 
Marti7i v. Safeway Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 
1139, 1140-41 (Utah 1977). Property own-
T^ATS v. COMMERCIAL SEC. BANK 
Cite as 746 P2d 1191 (Utah App. 1987) 
Utah H93 
or "*(V not insurer^ fo** f^(l 
bu^uo^s invitees. Id. 
safety of their 
[5] Applying this legal principle, the ev-
idence, viewed in a light favorable to the 
jury's verdict, adequately supports the ver-
dict that CSB was not negligent in the 
operation and maintenance of its parking 
terrace. Testimony revealed that CSB was 
servicing the fourth level of the parking 
terrace at approximately the time of Deats' 
early arrival. The jury could have reason-
ab'\ concluded that sufficient time had not 
elopsed since the ice formed such that CSB 
could have remedied thr: situation. 
In finding th?* CSB wa« not at all negli-
gent <be jury necessarily found that Deats 
was 100 percent negligent. The evidence, 
again viewed in a light favorable to the 
ju>w's verdict, supports the jury's determi-
nation that Deats was 100 percent negli-
gent. First, Deats admitted she knew the 
uncovered fourth level of the parking ter-
race was icv. Second, x>ats conceded she 
did nc have to park on the fourth level. 
Ind*1* a. on a prior occasion, Deats parked 
on an adjacent street when she knew the 
fo r^*'-1 level parking surtac° would be icy. 
1* 'd, Deats arrived b^< re sunrise. Given 
th^ ^ " M I V of th. c rcur^tances, we find 
the m -v s verdict rea^K.ole and mst. 
[P Doats attorn*^? 
y rv' \erd- *t ,?\v *»hid t 
chn > ing they 
com- s instni*T 
to imreach the 
s of two jurors. 
mi^nnrifrstood the trial 
ons L »> weh-established, 
ho-v.^pr. 'hat Rule W* e>) o' the Utah 
R"' - (»»" C-vil Prop* dure <1 iowF an affidavit 
r\ •> i^or to inr>pach the T'ird.<t only when 
tin* ^ Taict \\a-> d^tjrmined by chance or 
V " * n R^senlnf v. StJhvan, 6~6 P.2d 
^«J, 37 "> (Utah 1\'^'A\ UQ: altera:^ to mv 
p*MtJ> the verdict by w- v or affidavit is 
} «,M^ contrary to law. "'""he jurors' misun-
dei-,#»pdmg of ihe court's instruction is not 
one of the narrowlv defined grounds avail-
able under Rule 5<Vp)(2). 
III. 
[VQTPTTTIQN TWCNTY-FIVE 
DeaK' second issue on appeal is that 
i *rv ",n twenty-f've nrsstated the law 
rwr-ixJipfr n nl-»;rtiffs duty of care, there-
by causing the jury to erroneously find 
that CSB was not negligent. Deats con-
tends instruction twenty-five constitutes an 
"assumption of risk" instruction, which is 
not permissible under Utah's comparative 
negligence statutes. Utah Code \nn. 
§§ 78-27-37, -38 (1987). We disagree. 
Instruction twenty-five reads: 
Ordinarily, a plaintiff in any action has 
the duty of seeing and avoiding, if rea-
sonable, a hazard which is plainly visible, 
and if the plaintiff [unreasonably] failed 
to do so, then the plaintiff is negligent 
either in failing to look or in failing to 
heed what he or she saw. 
Deats urges us to interpret this instruc-
tion as meaning that Deats is barred from 
recovery if she failed to avoid the icy condi-
tions of the parking surface, regardless of 
whether she exercised reasonable care and 
regardless of whether { SB exercised rea-
sonable care. If this interpretation is cor-
rect, then Deats conterds the jury would 
not apportion the negligence between the 
parries \Ve reject Det is' construction of 
this instruction 
[71 In ;truct'ons are read in their ent're 
conT.j\t and given meaning in accordance 
wi ^ U>e ordinary and u^ual import of the 
lane . ge as it would be understood by lav-
jurors. Branson v. Strong, 17 Ltah '.id 
361 7)7, 412 P.2d 451, 4.52-53 (196*>) Un-
der Utah's comparative negligence st itute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (19^71, and its 
accompanying definite^ ''ounterpart, Utah 
Crde Ann. § 78-27-3 < iH*87), the concept 
of contributory negligence include^ what 
was lormeHy termed - condary ? sump-
tion <»{ nA" "the unrK^onabio ei-counur-
ing or a known an a appreciated risk" 
Mc<, n' v. b a rton L' ,% - < r <£ In y fly a,- e 
Co., 'Vil p.^d 865, V70 (Utah 11-U, we 
Jrm^en Constr Cv , , 1 9 P 2d at .'-10 312. 
More specifically, 
the reasonableness of plaintiffs ^nrhi^t 
in confronting a knoun or unknown risk 
created by defendant's negligence will 
basically be determined under principles 
of contributory negligence. Attention 
should be focused on whether a reason-
ably prudent man in the exercise of due 
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< i r « i » u M i \ « " ' < ' ' *v 't 'r (v~-
spite his knowledge of it, and if so, 
whether he would hatre conducted him-
self in the manner in whic*» the pliintiff 
acted in light of all the surrounding cir-
cumstances, including the appreciated 
risk 
J <*ob*<n Constr. r01 619 P 2d at 312. 
[81 Tt is well-settled that a pontiff, act-
ing in a reasonanbly prudent manner, has a 
duty to foresee a danger, Moore v. Burton 
Lumber & Hardware Co., 621 P 2d at 870, 
particularly one that is plainly visible, and 
avoid it. Hindmarsh v. O.P. Skaggs Food-
liner, 21 Utah 2d 413, 416-17, 446 P.2d 410, 
412 (1968). If a plaintiff fails to see or 
sees but fails to avoid the danger, then the 
plaintiff acted negligently. See Pollesche 
v K-Mnrt Enterprises of Utah, Inc., 520 
P2d 200 '203 (Utah 1974) (plaintiff who 
s^es ai'd ignores the danger is guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of 
law); Hindmarsh. 21 Utah 2d 413 at 417, 
4i<> P2d at 412; Whitman v. W.T. Grant 
Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 83, 395 P.2d 918, 920 
(1964) (plaintiff can be negligent either in 
failing to look or in failing to heed what he 
or she saw). 
Instruction twenty-five, when read to-
gether with all of the other instructions 
given on negligence, is a correct statement 
of a plaintiffs duty in a negligence action. 
Nowhere in instruction twenty-five, nor in 
any of tne other remaining thirty-eight in-
structions, did the icvA court intimate that 
if Deats was negligent then she was pre-
cluded from recovering. On the contrary, 
the instructions, when read in their entire-
ty, adequately informed the jury of CSB's 
duty of care as a property owner, Deats' 
duty of care, and raost importantly, of the 
procedure by which the jury must appor-
tion negligence if v ^ th parties were found 
to have acted negligently. 
The frial court properly denied Deats' 
motion for a new trial. The evidence sup-
porting the jury's findings was ample and 
convincing and t^e verdict, therefore, was 
not unreasonable nor "njust. Roy lance, 
:•>" p ^ vi ';•*'• ' T< n v. TrujWo, 657 
p o i ,«>/, - <T>
 n , 1<K*2). 
Hank. 
BENCH and GREENWOOD. ,U , 
concur. 
J^\ 
William Ray GAGON, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a/k/a State 
Farm Insurance Companies, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 860137-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 18, 1987. 
Insured brought action against auto-
mobile insurer for payment of claim ana 
bad faith refusal to pay claim. The Dis-
trict Court, John A. Rokich, J., Erected 
v?roict in favor of insurer on bid :V/r 
i/sue. Insured appealed. The Court of 
Appeal., Greenwood, J., held that evidence 
created jury question whether insurer re 
fused to pay claim in bad faith. 
Reversed f-nd remanded 
1. insurance e=^2.12(2) 
Ev;dence created jury question* wheth-
er insured shou i have known that t 
pump was damag°d after metal object iV 
from pickup true; and struck underside c: 
car, whether insurer fairly evaluated c1 > .i. 
for damage to encrire as resuk of i>ontuu 
tioning oil pump, and whether insurer re-
hired to pay in bad faith. 
2. ^retrial Proo Jure 0752 
Evidence of punitive damage ,T * ' ' 
admissible in mound's act" n ar; ' v*>* 
er ror payment » f claim ?nd « . i .:i »i r 
fusal to pay cl ».in, where uu g.» suited m 
MOORE v. BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE CO. Utah 8 6 5 
Cite as, Utah, 631 P.2d 865 
fit to testify in his own behalf, and the jury 
was not obligated to believe his testimony. 
Defendant points to the lack of direct 
testimony that the automobile was opera-
tional at the time of its theft. Inasmuch as 
it was uncontradicted that the automobile 
was stolen between 8:00 and 10:30 p. m. and 
was observed being driven into defendant's 
shed at 11:30 p. m. on the same evening, the 
jury was at liberty to infer that it was 
operational at the time of the theft. 
Defendant also contends that the only 
evidence connecting him to the theft was 
his possession of the recently stolen automo-
bile. However, the record contains other 
corroborative evidence, not the least of 
which is the following: 1) defendant's own 
explanation of his possession, 2) his conceal-
ment of the automobile and partial disman-
tlement, 3) his false claim of ownership and 
evidence of title, and 4) his admission to 
Detective Leonard of his knowledge that 
the automobile was stolen.14 
The conviction 
firmed. 
and judgment are af-
HOWE, J., and CALVIN GOULD, Dis-
trict Judge, concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
MAUGHAN, C. J., does net participate 
herein; GOULD, District Judge, sat. 
CROCKETT, J., heard the arguments, 
but retired before the opinion was written. 
Paul T. MOORE, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 16672. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 22, 1981. 
Defendant appealed from judgment of 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
David K. Winder, J., based on jury's special 
verdict which found defendant liable for 
personal injuries sustained by plaintiff 
while operating a radial arm saw on de-
fendant's business premises. The Supreme 
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) although 
trial court should have instructed that there 
was no duty to warn an invitee of an obvi-
ous danger so as to have avoided any possi-
ble misunderstanding, failure to do so was 
harmless; (2) since duty of plaintiff and 
consequences of a breach thereof were ex-
plained to jury in appropriate language, 
there was no error in not giving an instruc-
tion on r. condary assumption of risk in 
addition to a contributory negligence in-
struction; and (3) there was substantial evi-
dence in record to support jury's findings, 
and thus trial court did not err in failing to 
instruct jury that, as a matter of law, plain-
tiff was negligent and that the negligence 
was sole cause of the injury, or alternative-
ly that it waG a proximate cause of the 
injury. 
Affirmed. 
Hall, J., dissented and filed opinion in 
which Crockett, J., concurred. 
14. See State v. Kinsey, 11 Utah 348. 295 P. 247 
(1931); State v. Thomas, 121 Utah 639, 244 
P.2d653 (1952). 
1. Appeal and Error <&=> 1068(5) 
Products Liability <s=*96 
In action to recover for injuries sus-
tained when plaintiff was using radial arm 
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saw on defendant's business premises, trial 
court, in order to avoid any possible misun-
derstanding by jury, should have instructed 
that there was no duty to warn an invitee 
of an obvious danger, but failure to do so 
was harmless, because, in light of specific 
findings of jury that plaintiff was negligent 
but that his negligence was not a proximate 
cause of the injury and that defendant was 
negligent and that its negligence was a 
proximate cause of the injury, there was no 
reasonable likelihood that there would have 
been a result more favorable to defendant 
had the instruction been given as requested. 
2. Trial <s=>358 
A jury's answers to special interrogato-
ries must, if at all possible, be read harmo-
niously. 
3. Negligence <s=>67, 105 
A plaintiff's failure to foresee a danger 
which a reasonable person acting in a pru-
dent manner would have foreseen is "desig-
nated negligent conduct," whereas "as-
sumption of risk" designates conduct of a 
person who unreasonably takes a known 
and appreciated risk. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Negligence <3=>105 
"Assumption of risk," as that term is 
used in statute providing that contributory 
negligence shall not bar recovery in a negli-
gence action, is a voluntary and unreason-
able exposure to a known danger. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-27-37. 
5. Negligence <s=>97 
"Secondary assumption of risk," which 
is the unreasonable encountering of a 
known and appreciated risk and in reality 
an aspect of contributory negligence, is 
treated in same manner as contributory 
negligence for purpose of apportioning 
fault under comparative negligence statute. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
1. Deal's lumber was purchased out of state and 
stored at Intermountain Lumber ("Intermoun-
6. Trial <s=>260(8) 
In action to recover for injuries sus-
tained when plaintiff was using radial arm 
saw on defendant's business premises, there 
was no error in not giving an instruction on 
secondary assumption of risk in addition to 
a contributory negligence instruction since 
duty of plaintiff and consequences of a 
breach thereof were explained to jury in 
appropriate language; overruling Rigtrup 
v. Strawberry Water Users Ass'n., 563 P.2d 
1247, U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37. 
7. Products Liability <s=>85, 96 
There was substantial evidence in rec-
ord to support findings of jury that defend-
ant was liable for personal injuries sus-
tained by plaintiff while operating radial 
arm saw on defendant's business premises, 
and thus trial court correctly refused to 
instruct jury that, as a matter of law, plain-
tiff was negligent and that the negligence 
was sole cause of the injury, or alternative-
ly that it was a proximate cause of the 
injury. 
Raymond M. Berry, Brucett Jensen, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and appellant. 
W. Eugene Hansen, Ralph L. Dewsnup, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respon-
dent. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Defendant appeals from a judgment 
based on a jury's special verdict which 
found defendant liable for personal injuries 
sustained by plaintiff while operating a ra-
dial arm saw on defendant's business prem-
ises. 
During approximately a two-year period, 
from June 1973 to May 1975, plaintiff su-
pervised a large building project for Deal 
Development Company ("Deal") in Salt 
Lak? City. Deal had an open account with 
defendant which was used in charging 
hardware items purchased for the project.1 
Shortly before noon on May 1, 1975, 
plaintiff and one Buddy Prince, a fellow 
tain"), several blocks away from defendant's 
business premises. 
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employee of Deal, drove to defendant's 
business premises in plaintiff's pickup 
truck. Their purpose was to buy some 
hardware items and to ask permission to 
use defendant's radial arm saw to cut sever-
al two-by-fours into blocks to be used in 
enclosing air-conditioning ducts. While 
Prince gathered the hardware items, plain-
tiff went to the front desk to seek permis-
sion to use the radial arm saw. There is 
substantial conflict in the evidence as to 
what thereafter transpired.2 
Plaintiff apparently spoke with defend-
ant's office manager who quoted plaintiff a 
price per cut for the use of the saw, but no 
set price was agreed upon. Plaintiff testi-
fied that thereafter someone told him to 
check with the yardmen and that if the saw 
was not being used, it would be all right for 
him to use it. 
Plaintiff went out into the yard and told 
a .yardman by the flame of Jessie that he 
had been given permission to use the saw. 
Jessie led plaintiff to the saw shed, where 
plaintiff offered to give Jessie a six-pack of 
beer if he would change the blade before 
plaintiff got back from Intermountain 
Lumber with the lumber to be cut. Jessie 
allegedly agreed, and plaintiff and Prince 
then drove to Intermountain where they 
picked up the two-by-fours they planned to 
cut into blocks. Plaintiff claims they 
stopped at a small store where they bought 
the beer promised to Jessie. They then 
returned to defendant's business premises 
and entered through the back gate. 
Plaintiff entered the saw shed and no-
ticed that the saw had been reset from the 
ripping position to the cross-cut position. 
He then measured the length he wanted to 
cut and drove a nail into the table for use 
as a gauge so that he wou)d not ha ye to 
measure each cut separately. Plaintiff 
started the saw and cut the first two-by-
four by placing its end against the nail 
gauge, pulling the saw toward him and 
returning it, then knocking the cut block 
2. Defendant and its employees dispute plain-
tiffs claim that he received permission to use 
the saw. For the purposes of this appeal, we 
view the facts in the light most favorable to the 
out of the way, and moving his two-by-four 
up to the nail gauge to repeat the process. 
This procedure was following approximate-
ly seven to nine times. 
When he finished cutting the first two-
by-four, plaintiff pushed the saw back to its 
return position and went to the end of the 
table to get the second two-by-four. He 
took hold of the second two-by-four with 
both hands and moved it along the table in 
front of a one-by-four which served as a 
guide. Plaintiff momentarily directed his 
attention to the nail gauge on the table to 
make sure the two-by-four abutted it, when 
suddenly the saw cut his hand. Before he 
could pull his hand away from the saw, his 
thumb and his index and middle fingers of 
his right hand were severed, and his re-
maining two fingers were severely cut. 
There is no evidence that the blade of the 
saw cut through the board and then into 
plaintiff's fingers, or that plaintiff either 
manually pulled the saw into a cutting posi-
tion, or that he moved his hand into the 
saw, as is speculated by the dissent. Nor is 
there evidence that the manner in which 
plaintiff placed his hand on the board was 
improper. 
The testimony at trial included evidc ice. 
that the radial arm saw had been in use on 
defendant's premises for over thirty year^ 
without an accident. There was a sign 
hanging on the wall opposite the saw which 
read in large yellow letters, 'To r Use of 
Authorized Operator Only." Plaintiff testi-
fied to having had experience operating 
such saws, and, although he admitted that 
su-.h saws are, by their very nature, ex-
tremely dangerous, he claimed he was com-
petent to opt rat 3 the saw without a\v in-
struction or assistance. 
The evidence indicated that the saw vas 
equinped with a hood guard which serves to 
control direction of the sawdust produced 
by cutting wood; it, is not designed to be a 
safety guard but could be rotated down 
against most thicknesses of lumber. Plain-
verdict. Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. 
Meibos, Utah, 6'Jl P.2d 798 (1980); Rod&e-s v. 
Hansen, Utah, 5S0 P.2d 233 (1978). 
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t iffs expert testified that the hood guard 
was not an adequate blade guard, that is, a 
guard designed to prevent the operator of 
the saw from coming into contact with the 
saw blade. International standards for 
blade guards require that such guards per-
mit no more than 3/s inch clearance between 
the bottom of the guard and the saw table 
when the blade is exposed. Even if the 
hood guard were rotated down, once the 
lumber was cut the clearance between the 
bottom of the guard and the table would 
exceed % inch. Thus, even had plaintiff 
rotated the hood guard down so that it 
would contact the two-by-four being cut, 
the guard would not have prevented plain-
tiffs hand from being drawn into the blade 
of the saw. 
In addition, plaintiffs expert testified 
that the saw in question was not equipped 
with a system to prevent the spinning blade 
from creeping forward from its rest posi-
tion. A large spinning blade will creep 
forward unless it is restrained, either me-
chanically or by gravity. In a mechanical 
restraint system a spring or a pulley and 
weight system holds the blade in the maxi-
mum rearward position. The same result 
can be obtained by simply tilting the front 
of the table slightly so that gravity keeps 
the blade in the proper rest position. In the 
opinion of plaintiffs expert, the lack of 
proper blade guards and a blade restraining 
system rendered the saw in question "defec-
tive and unreasonably dangerous." 
. A special verdict was returned finding 
both plaintiff and defendant negligent, but, 
significantly, the jury also found plaintiffs 
negligence not to have been a cause of the 
injury. The jury also found that plaintiff 
was a business invitee and not a licensee or 
trespasser and assessed damages in the 
amount of $144,892. The court entered 
judgment in that amount against defend-
ant. Defendant's motion for a new trial 
was denied, and this appeal followed. 
[1] Defendant's first claim on appeal is 
that the trial court prejudicially erred in 
refusing to instruct the jury that there is no 
duty to warn a business invitee of an obvi-
ous danger. Specifically, defendant argues 
that because one instruction informed the 
jury that there was no duty to warn licen-
sees of obvious dangers, the failure to give 
such an instruction with respect to invitees 
may have led the jury to believe erroneous-
ly that defendant should have warned 
plaintiff as to obvious dangers. Defendant 
also claims that the trial court erred in 
failing to instruct on the defense of as-
sumption of risk and in refusing to submit 
that defense to the jury for a finding in the 
special verdict. 
There are of course certain risks which 
anyone of adult age must be taken to ap-
preciate. Wold v. Ogden City, 123 Utah 
270, 258 P.2d 453 (1953); Prosser, Handbook 
of the Law of Torts (4th ed.) § 61 p. 394, see 
also § 68 p. 448. It has long been held that 
a property owner has no obligation to warn 
an invitee of dangers which are known to 
the invitee or which are so obvious and 
apparent that he may reasonably be expect-
ed to discover them. Defendant specifically 
contends that the evidence supported its 
theory that the dangers were obvious and 
that the defendant therefore had no duty to 
warn plaintiff of such dangers. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the 
trial cuurt should have instructed that th< re 
was no duty to warn an invitee of an obvi-
ous dnnger so as to have avoided any possi-
ble misunderstanding. Steele v. Denver <fe 
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 16 
Utah 2d 127, 396 P.2J 751 (1964); see ai;o 
ElierLson v. Dansie, Utah, 576 P.2d 867 
(1978). Nevertheless, the failure to do so 
was harmless. 
There was no evidence that the specific 
dangers for which the defendant could be 
held responsible and which could have 
caused the injury—the lack of certain blad** 
guards and the creeping of the saw—were 
such obvious and common hazards as to be 
apparent to a layman or one with plaintiff's 
background. The evidence which did relate 
to the obviousness of the danger of the saw 
went to its inherent danger rather than the 
specific dangers created by the lack of 
blade guards and the tendency of the saw 
to creep forward. As to these defects, 
there was expert testimony that the saw 
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was defective and unreasonably dangerous. 
But there was no testimony that the creep-
ing was obvious to one in plaintiff's shoes or 
that the plaintiff knew or should have 
known about the availability of the blade 
guards. 
[2] In answer to a special interrogatory, 
the jurors specifically found that plaintiff 
was negligent, but that his negligence was 
not a proximate cause of the injury. On 
the other hand, the jury specifically found 
that defendant was negligent and that its 
negligence was a proximate cause of the 
injury. To accept defendant's theory that 
the injury resulted from the failure to warn 
or correct an obvious danger would result in 
a finding that plaintiff's negligence was a 
proximate cause of the injury—in direct 
conflict with the jury's finding on proxi-
mate cause. The jury's responses to the 
special interrogatories are consistent only 
on the proposition that the injury resulted 
from a nonobvious danger. Therefore, be-
cause a jury's answers to special interroga-
tories must, if at all possible, be read har-
moniously, Weber Basin Water Conservan-
cy Dist. v. Nelson, 11 Utah 2d 253, 358 P.2d 
81 (1960); Van Clove v. Betts, 16 Wash. 
Apn. 748, 559 P.2d 1006 (1977), and in light 
of the presumption that the jury followed 
the instructions, we must reject defendant's 
theory. Clearly, under the instructions, the 
jury could have found plaintiff's negligence 
a proximate cause but chose not to do so. 
In sum, although Instruction 22 did not 
state that defendant had a duty to warn of 
obvious dangers,3 the error was harmless 
because there was no "reasonable likelihood 
. . . that . . . there would have been a re-
sult more favorable" to defendant had the 
instruction been as requested. Rowley v. 
Graven Bros. & Co., 26 Utah 2d 448, 451, 
491 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1971). See also Lee v. 
3. Instruction No. 22, which was given by the 
court, stated: 
If you find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that, at the time of his injury, Mr. 
Moore was defendant's "business invitee," as 
chat term is defined hereinafter, then defend-
ant's duty to Mr. Moore was to refrain from 
any acts of negligence toward him; to exer-
cise reasonable care to keep the premises, 
Mitchell Funeral Home Ambulance Serv., 
Utah, 606 P.2d 259 (1980). 
The next issue arises out of the trial 
court's refusal to instruct the jury on as-
sumption of risk. Both plaintiff and de-
fendant submitted proposed instructions on 
the issue. The judge's rationale for his 
ruling was as follows: 
I think it is a negligence case, is what it 
is, a comparative negligence case. I 
think the instructions ought to be limited 
to that, excluding assumption of the risk 
which, under comparative negligence, is 
part of comparative [contributory] negli-
gence. 
Undoubtedly, in so ruling the court had in 
mind § 78-27-37 U.C.A. (1953), which pro-
vides: 
Contributory negligence shall not bar re-
covery in an action by any person or his 
legal representative to recover damages 
for negligence or gross negligence result-
ing in death or in injury to person or 
property, if such negligence was not as 
great as the negligence or gross negli-
gence of the person against whom recov-
ery is sought, but any damages allowed 
shall be diminished in the proportion to 
the amount of negligence attributable to 
the person recovering. As used in this 
act, "contributory negligence" includes 
"assumption of the risk." 
With time it has become clear that the 
assumption of risk defense in fact included 
at lenst three different legal concepts. Sen 
Jacobsen Construction Co. v. Structo-L;tn 
Engineering, Inc., Ut-ih, 619 P.2d 306 
(1930), and authorities there cited. On^ 
form of assumption of risk has been re-
ferred to by some as primary assumption of 
risk, which may be either expressed ^ im-
plied. The "primary express" form involves 
an agreement by the plaintiff to accept the 
including the radial arm saw thereon, in a 
condition reasonably safe for purposes con-
sistent with his presence there: and to warn 
him of any and all dangers involving the 
operation of said saw which .vere known to 
the defendant or should have become known 
to the defendant in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence and the performance of reasonable 
inspections. 
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risk or danger, and the "primary implied" 
form involves a relationship in which de-
fendant simply owes no duty of care to the 
plaintiff. Secondary assumption of risk is, 
as stated, the unreasonable encountering of 
a known and appreciated risk and in reality 
an aspect of contributory negligence. 
Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water User's Ass'n
 y 
Utah, 563 P.2d 1247 (1977); Jacobsen Con-
struction Co. v. Structo-Lite Engineering, 
Inc., supra. 
[3] Both assumption of risk and contrib-
utory negligence are founded on unreason-
able conduct. Each concept focuses on a 
different aspect of unreasonableness in the 
face of a risk of harm. A plaintiffs failure 
to foresee a danger which a reasonable per-
son acting in a prudent manner would have 
foreseen is designated negligent conduct. 
Assumption of risk designates conduct of a 
person who unreasonably takes a known 
and appreciated risk. 
[4, 5] Assumption of risk, as that term is 
used in § 78-27-37, is a voluntary and 
unreasonable exposure to a known danger. 
Jacobsen Construction Company v. Structo-
Lite Engineering, Inc., supra. The com-
plete bar to recovery in an action for negli-
gence, which assumption of risk has been 
historically, has been lifted by the Utah 
comparative negligence statute to avoid the 
harshness visited upon plaintiffs as a result 
of the all-or-nothing nature of the former 
rule of law.4 Secondary assumption of risk 
is treated in the same manner as contribu-
tory negligence for the purpose of appor-
tioning fault under the comparative negli-
gence statute. Higtrup v. Strawberry 
Water User's Ass'n, Utah, 563 P.2d 1247 
(1977). The relationship between the two 
concepts was explained in Jacobsen Con-
struction Company v. Structo-Lite Engi-
neering, Inc., supra at 312: 
. . . the reasonableness of p fain tiff's con-
duct in confronting a known or unknown 
risk created by defendant's negligence 
will b?sically be determined under princi-
ples of contributory negligence. Atten-
4. Comparative principles as to a plaintiffs and 
defendant's liability in causing personal injury 
were recently held to apply in strict liability 
tion should be focused on whether a rea-
sonably prudent man in the exercise of 
due care would have incurred the risk, 
despite his knowledge of it, and if so, 
whether he would have conducted himself 
in the manner in which the plaintiff acted 
in light of all the surrounding circum-
stances, including the appreciated risk. 
See Leavitt v. Gillaspie, Alaska, 443 P.2d 
61 (1968). Then, if plaintiff's unreason-
ableness is viewed to be less than that of 
defendant, according to the terms of the 
statute, "any damages allowed shall be 
diminished in proportion to the amount of 
negligence attributable to the person re-
covering." [Footnote omitted.] 
In light of the difficulties arising from 
the several meetings of the term assump-
tion of risk, some authorities have advocat-
ed the complete abolition of the term "as-
sumption of risk" and the utilization of 
other legal terminology to describe the con-
duct. See 2 Harper and James, Law of 
Torts § 21.8 at 1191-92 (1956); Flemming, 
Law of Torts, 241-58 (2nd ed. 1961). We 
agree. 
Defendant maintains that Rigtrup v. 
Strawberry Water Users Ass'n, Utah, 563 
P.2d 1247 (1977), heM that assumption cf 
risk is still a complete bar to recovery. 
Insofar as that part of assumption of risk 
which is an aspect of contributory negli-
gence is concerned, that case did not so 
hold. Rigtrup recognized that "where there 
is a known danger, the risk of which is 
voluntarily assumed by a party, such action 
may well fall within the lack of due care 
which constitutes negligence and may also 
be correctly termed a/* assumption of risk." 
[563 P.2d at 1250.] The Court referred to 
the statutory language that "contributory 
negligence includes assumption of risk' un-
der tne comparative r.egligence statute and 
stated that the statuto "indicates a cfe;-.r 
legislative intent to recognize the doctrine 
of assumption of risK' as an aspect of con-
tributory negligence in Utah law." [Ibid] 
The Court held assumption of risk shoui j be 
cases. Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., Utah, 
628 P.2d 1301 (1981). 
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treated in a comparative manner as an as-
pect of contributory negligence. Neverthe-
less, the Court did approve the giving of 
instructions on both assumption of risk and 
contributory negligence. 
[6] Even though decided after the ap-
peal in this case, the principles governing 
the relationship of contributory negligence 
and assumption of risk enunciated in Jacob-
sen are controlling here. Since the duty of 
the plaintiff and the consequences of a 
breach thereof were explained to the jury 
in appropriate language, there was no error 
in not giving an instruction on secondary 
assumption of risk in addition to a contribu-
tory negligence instruction. In short, we do 
not think that instructions on both contrib-
utory negligence and assumption of risk in 
this case were necessary. To the extent 
that Rigtrup is inconsistent with this opin-
ion, it is hereby overruled. It follows from 
what has been stated that it was not error 
to refuse to require the jury to make a 
specific additional finding in the language 
of assumption of risk beyond that required 
in the contributory negligence interrogato-
ry. Further support for the conclusion is 
found in the fact that defendant's proposed 
assumption of risk instructions, which were 
not given, were erroneous and could not 
have provided a foundation for the inter-
rogatory.5 
Finally, there is no contention in this case 
that there was an agreement whereby 
plaintiff agreed to accept the danger here, 
nor was the relationship between plaintiff 
and defendant such that defendant had no 
duty of care to the plaintiff. 
5. Indeed, defendant's proposed Instruction 
Nos. 11 and 12 on "assumption of risk" clearly 
incorporated classical contributory negligence 
language: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
There is a legal principal [sic] commonly 
referred to by the term "assumption of risk" 
which is as follows: 
One is said to assume a risk when he vol-
untarily manifests his assent to a dangerous 
condition and voluntarily exposes himself to 
that danger when he knows, or in the exer-
cise of ordinary care would know, that a 
danger exists in the condition of the equip-
ment or premises and uses the equipment 
and premises and voluntarily places himself 
or remains, within the position of danger. 
[7J Defendant's final claim on appeal is 
that the jury should have been instructed 
that, as a matter of law, plaintiff was negli-
gent and that the negligence was the sole 
cause of the injury, or alternatively that it 
was a proximate cause of the injury. The 
court correctly refused to give the instruc-
tion. Clearly there were factual issues both 
as to negligence on the part of both parties 
and as to the cause of the injury, and we 
are obliged to sustain the jury's findings 
because there was substantial evidence in 
the record to support those findings. Malt-
by v. Cox Construction Co., Utah, 598 P.2d 
336 (1979); Gordon v. Provo City 15 Utah 
2d 287, 391 P.2d 430 (1964). 
The judgment is affirmed. Costs to 
plaintiff. 
MAUGHAN, C. J., and WILKINS, J.,* 
concur. 
HALL, Justice (dissenting): 
It appears from the evidence that one of 
three things, or a combination thereof, 
could have caused plaintiff's injuries: 1) 
lack of a blade guard, 2) creeping of the 
blade, or 3) plaintiff's inattention. 
The record contains no direct evidence 
that the lack of a blade guard or the creep-
ing of the saw blade actually caused the 
accident. Plaintiff's expert witness did tes-
tify, however, as to the obvious nature of 
those two dangers. He opined that it was 
"plain to see" that the saw was "unreasona-
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
Before the doctrine of assumption of risk is 
applicable, you must find: (1) the person in 
question must have actual knowledge of th'i 
canger, or the conditions must be such that 
he would have such knowledge if he exer-
cised ordinary' care, (2) he must have free-
dom of choice. This freedom of choice must 
have come from circumstances that provide 
him a reasonable opportunity, without violat-
ing any legal or moral duty to safely refuse to 
expose himself to the danger in question. 
An intenogatory based on those definitions of 
assumption of risk would have been improper. 
* Wi'kins, Justice, acted on this case prior to his 
resignation. 
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b!y dangerous" since it lacked a blade 
guard, and since it "had a tendency to 
move" forward from the rest position. 
These dangers were certainly obvious to 
him since he based his opinion, not upon his 
operation or testing of the saw, but simply 
upon his brief observation of it, from which 
he theorized that the blade, turning up to 
4,000 rpm, would cause "some movement of 
the blade." Anyone with plaintiffs experi-
ence and familiarity with saws could, and 
should have readily made the same observa-
tion before proceeding to use the saw. 
Plaintiffs testimony as to causation was: 
I took the two-by-four and I slid it in 
front of the one-by-four [guide] towards 
the nail [gauge] and against the one-by-
four . . . . As I glanced over now to 
focus my attention on that nail and to 
make sure this edge of the two-by-four 
was up against the one-by-four, I felt the 
saw grab my thumb and yank my hand 
into the blade . . . . 
In light of the foregoing explanation of 
the event by plaintiff, it matters not wheth-
er the "tendency of the blade to move" was 
an obvious danger, since it seems that it 
could not have been a cause of the accident 
anyway. This is to be seen in that had the 
blade in fact crept forward, it would neces-
sarily have come to rest when it came in 
contact with the- two-by-four plaintiff was 
positioning to cut. Certainly, without man-
ual assistance, the blade could not have cut 
through the two-by-four which it would 
have had to do to reach plaintiffs hand. 
This assumes, of course, that plaintiffs 
hand was properly positioned on the front 
side of the two-by-four, away from the 
blade. 
Inasmuch as the jury found negligence on 
the part of the plaintiff, it apparently con-
cluded that plaintiff did not properly posi-
tion his hand on the front side of the two-
1. State v. Ouzcunian, 26 Utah 2d 442, 491 P.zd 
1093 (1971); see also, Rowley v. Graven Broth-
ers & Co., 26 Utah 2d 448, 491 P.2d 1209 
(1971). 
2. Utah, 563 P.2d 1247 (1977). 
X U.C.A.mr-3, 7^-27-37. 
by-four, away from the blade, but that by 
inattention or otherwise, he reached over 
the two-by-four to the back side thereof, 
and into the blade. 
When viewed in light of all of the facts 
of this case, I deem the error in failing to 
give an "obvious danger" instruction as not 
merely harmless. The failure to give an 
instruction to which a party is entitled may 
constitute reversible error if it tends to: 1) 
mislead the jury to the prejudice of the 
complaining party; or 2) insufficiently or 
erroneously advises the jury as to the law.1 
In this case, the absence of an obvious dan-
ger instruction may well have prevented a 
proper determination as to whether defend-
ant was negligent in the first instance. 
Therefore, I view the error as prejudicial. 
What has heretofore been said applies 
equally to the court's refusal to instruct the 
jury on the doctrine of assumption of risk. 
Notwithstanding the position taken by the 
main opinion, I view the case of Rigtrup v. 
Strawberry Water Users Association2 as 
standing for the proposition that the doc-
trine of assumption of risk remains a viable 
defense, it being consistent with the con-
cepts of comparative fault as delineated in 
the Comparative Negligence Act.3 More-
over, Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P., specifically desig-
nates both asrumption of risk and contribu-
tory negligence as affirmative defenses. 
Application of the doctrine of assumption 
of risk requires knowledge by plaintiff of i 
specific defect or dangerous condition.4 As-
sumption of the risk and contributory negli-
gence are distinct legal doctrines. The fc-
mer applies where one voluntarily exposes 
himself to known danger, and the latter 
applies where one negligently fails to dis-
cover the danger.5 Situations may arise 
where the two doctrines may overlap as 
noted by Dean Prosser: 
4. Ferguson v. Jongsma, 10 Utah 2d 179. 350 
F.2d 404 (li:?:); Johnson v. Maynard, 9 L'uh 
2d 268, 342 F.?d 884 (1959); see also. Foster v. 
Steed, 23 Utah 2d 148, 459 P.2d 1021 (1969). 
5. Kuchennwister v. Los Angeles and S.LR. Co.. 
52 Utah 1 ]*;, 1 ,2 P. 725 (1918); see also. City 
v. Dunford, 121 Utah 177, 239 P.2d 1075(1952). 
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Obviously the two may co-exist when the 
plaintiff makes an unreasonable choice to 
incur the risk; but either may exist with-
out the other. The significant difference, 
when there is one, is likely to be one 
between risks which were in fact known 
to the plaintiff, and risks which he mere-
ly might have discovered by the exercise 
of ordinary care.6 
In the past, the terms have often been 
rather loosely applied. This was so because 
each was a complete defense to a negli-
gence action, that is, whether one knowing-
ly or negligently "assumed the risk," the 
result was the same—no recovery. When 
the legislature passed our Comparative 
Negligence Act, supra, it specifically recog-
nized the doctrine of "assumption of the 
risk" and included it within the term "con-
tributory negligence." Since the enactment 
thereof, this Court has held that assumption 
of risk remains a viable defense in Utah. 
In Rigtrup, supra, this Court approved the 
giving of instructions both on contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk. The 
matter was stated therein as follows: 
Though there have been some differ-
ences in view as to the defense of as-
sumption of risk and its relation to other 
aspects of contributory negligence, it has 
since time immemorial been regarded as 
a valid defense in the law of this State. 
It has sometimes been said to be but a 
specialized aspect of contributory negli-
gence in that it can be intermingled and 
fused with other aspects thereof in cer-
tain circumstances. It is also sometimes 
said to be something separate from con-
tributory negligence, as it undoubtedly 
can be in some circumstances. However, 
it requires but little reflection to see that 
where there is a known danger, the risk 
of which is voluntarily assumed by a par-
ty, such action may well fall within the 
lack of due care which constitutes negli-
gence and also may be correctly termed 
6. Handbook of the Law of Torts, William Pros-
ser (4th ed.). § Go, at p. 441. 
7. Jncob.-rn Const. Co. v. Structo-Lite Engineer-
ing, Inc., Utah, G13 P.2d 306 (1980). It is to be 
noted that the holding in Jacobsen did not abol-
SER & HARDWARE CO. Utah 8 7 3 
31 P.2d865 
an assumption of risk. [Citations omit-
ted.] If such be the situation, the party 
should be charged with the responsibility 
for his conduct, by whatever term it may 
be called; and the comparative negli-
gence statute quoted above should be ap-
plied . . . . 
That our conclusion just stated is the 
correct one under our law is supported, 
not only by the reasoning just stated and 
the cases cited, but is made abundantly 
clear by the fact that the legislature, 
apparently in order to avoid any misun-
derstanding thereon, appended the last 
sentence as quoted above that: as used in 
this act, "contributory negligence , , in-
cludes "assumption of the risk." That 
sentence indicates a clear legislative in-
tent to recognize the doctrine of "as-
sumption of risk" as an aspect of contrib-
utory negligence in Utah law. Therefore 
any attempt on our part to judicially 
abolish that defense would amount to a 
direct repudiation of the legislative ex-
pression and thus a clear usurpation of 
the legislative prerogative.9 
9 See Becker v. Beaverton School Dist., 25 
Or.App. 879, 551 P.2d 498, where the court 
refused to rule that a comparative negligence 
statute had completely abolished the defense 
of assumption of the risk. 
Therefore, the negligence of a plaintiff 
who knowingly and voluntarily encounters 
a risk is to be compared with any of that of 
a defendant pursuant to the provisions of 
the Comparative Negligence Act, supra.7 
In the instant case, plaintiff's knowledge 
and appreciation of the danger involved in 
operating the saw was a question for the 
juiy,8 and it was error for the court not to 
give an appropriate instruction on such as-
sumption of risk. 
I wjuld reverse and ren.and for the pur-
pose of a new trial. 
CROCKETT, J., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of HALL, J. 
isii assumption of risk as a defense, but only 
suggested the abolition of "assumption of risk" 
terminology. 
8. Wold v. Ogden City, 123 Utah 270, 258 P.2d 
453 (1953). 
631 P. 2d—20 
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JACOBSEN CONSTRUCTION COMPA-
NY, INC., a corporation; Jelco, Incorpo-
rated, a corporation; and Central Utah 
Water Conservancy District, a body cor-
porate and politic, Plaintiffs and Re-
spondents, 
v. 
STRUCTO-LITE ENGINEERING, INC., 
a corporation, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 16208. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 1, 1980. 
Contractors building water treatment 
plant filed action against subcontractors 
who constructed chemical storage tanks on 
theories of negligence and breach of ex-
press warranty for faulty construction of 
such storage tanks. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake, James S. Sawaya, J., en-
tered judgment on a verdict which had been 
directed against subcontractors and reduced 
damages based on contributory negligence 
and assumption of risk. Appeals were tak-
en. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held 
that: (1) under Utah's comparative negli-
gence statute, "assumption of risk" lan-
guage is not appropriate to describe the 
various concepts previously dealt with un-
der that terminology, but is to be treated, 
in its secondary sense, as contributory negli-
gence, and reasonableness of plaintiffs con-
duct in confronting a known or unknown 
risk created by defendant's negligence will 
basically be determined under principles of 
contributory negligence, and (2) in a negli-
gence action wherein assumption of risk is 
raised, attention should be focused upon 
whether a reasonably prudent man in the 
exercise of due care would have incurred 
the risk, despite his knowledge of it, and, if 
so, whether he would have conducted him-
self in the manner in which plaintiff acted 
in light of all surrounding circumstances, 
including the appreciated risk, and then, if 
plaintiff's unreasonableness is viewed to be 
less than that of defendant, according to 
the terms of comparative negligence stat-
ute, any damages allowed shall be diminish-
ed in proportion to the amount of negli-
gence attributable to the person recovering. 
Judgment affirmed. 
Hall, J., concurred in the result 
Crockett, C. J., concurred in the result 
and filed opinion. 
1. Contracts <3=» 350(1) 
Negligence e=> 135(1) 
In negligence and express warranty ac-
tion by contractor building water treatment 
plant against subcontractors who construct-
ed chemical storage tanks, evidence sup-
ported verdict of contributory negligence, 
and, furthermore, supported jury's finding 
of assumption of risk. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-
37. 
2. Negligence @=>105 
For purposes of action brought by con-
tractors building water treatment plant 
against subcontractors who constructed 
chemical storage tanks, term "assumption 
of risk" meant voluntary, yet unreasonable, 
encounter with known, appreciated risk. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Negligence c=>97 
The complete bar to recovery which 
"assumption of risk" once constituted in a 
negligence action has been abolished by the 
comparative negligence statute to avoid the 
harshness visited upon plaintiffs as a result 
of the all-or-nothing nature of the former 
rule of law. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37. 
4. Negligence <3=> 105 
In its primary sense, assumption of risk 
is alternative expression for proposition 
that defendant was not negligent, that is, 
there was no duty owed or there was no 
breach of existing duties; in its secondary 
sense, assumption of n k is affirmative de-
fense to established breach of duty and as 
such is phase of contributory negligence. 
U.C.A 1953, 78-27-37. 
5. Negligence c=>97 
Under Utah's comparative negligence 
statute, "assumption of risk" language is 
not appropriate to describe various concepts 
previously dealt with under that terminolo-
gy but is to be treated, in its secondary 
nt of negli-
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sense, as contributory negligence; specifi- STEWART, Justice: 
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cally, reasonableness of plaintiffs* conduct 
in confronting known or unknown risk cre-
ated by defendant's negligence will basical-
ly be determined under principles of con-
tributory negligence. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-
37. 
6. Negligence c=>98 
For purposes of assumption-of risk de-
fense under comparative negligence statute, 
attention should be focused on whether rea-
sonably prudent man in exercise of due care 
would have incurred risk, despite his knowl-
edge of it, and, if so, whether he would 
have conducted himself in manner in which 
plaintiff acted in light of all surrounding 
circumstances, including appreciated risk; 
then, if plaintiff's unreasonableness is 
viewed to be less than that of defendant, 
according to terms of comparative negli-
gence statute, any damages allowed shall be 
diminished in proportion to amount of neg-
ligence attributable to person recovering. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-27 37. 
7. Contracts c^3f>4 
Negligence c=^142 
In action brought by contractors build-
ing water treatment plant against subcon-
tractors who constructed chemical storage 
tanks on theories of negligence and breach 
of express warranty wherein jury appor-
tioned by percentage fault of each party 
without differentiating between negligence 
and breach of express warranty causes of 
ai lion, since same conduct of defendant 
constituted both negligence and breach of 
warranty and jury was instructed that 
damages arising from breach of warranty 
were same as for negligence, finding of 
assumption of risk applied equally to both 
negligence and warranty claims. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-27-37. 
Raymond M. Berry and H. James Clegg 
of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Harold 
A. Hintze, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
and appellant. 
Arthur H. Nielsen and W. Waldan Lloyd 
of Nielsen, Henriod, Gottfredson & Peck, 
Edward W. Clyde of Clyde & Pratt, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs and respondents. 
This appeal by defendant is from a judg-
ment awarding plaintiffs damages resulting 
from defendant's faulty construction of a 
fiberglass storage tank. Defendant's claim 
is that the jury's finding of assumption of 
risk entirely precludes a judgment for 
plaintiff under both of plaintiffs' theories 
of recovery: negligence and breach of ex-
press warranty. The central issues raised 
are (1) whether assumption of risk is a 
complete bar to plaintiffs' recovery under 
Utah's comparative negligence statute, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, § 78-
27-37, and (2) whether assumption of risk 
constitutes a defense to an action for 
breach of express warranty. 
Plaintiffs Jacobsen Construction Compa-
ny and Jelco, Inc. ("Jacobsen-Jelco"), act-
ing as joint venturers, contracted with 
plaintiff Central Utah Water Conservancy 
District ("Conservancy District") to build a 
water treatment plant. Jacobsen-Jelco en-
tered into a subcontract with defendant 
Strrcto-Lite Engineering, Inc. ("Structo-
Lite") whereby Structo-Lite would provide 
si:: fiberglass chemical storage tanks con-
struct td in accordance with the plans and 
specifications of the project engineers, 
tlii»\! party defendant Templeton, Linkj 
and Associates. 
Mr. Bevan, president of Structo-Lite : 
represented to Jacobsen's agent that Struc-
to-Lito would fabricate fiberglass tanks 
which would meet the plans and specifica-
tions of the project engineers. Mr. l:Jevan 
personally signed the purchase order widen 
provided that Structo Lite would supply 
the tanks in conformitv with all engineer-
ing plans and specifications and thai they 
would be warranted by Structo-Lite as to 
qualify of workmanship and materials. 
After defendant delivered the taaks to 
the job site, the project superintendent for 
Jacol sen- Jelco observed that some of the 
temporary supports used to maintain round-
ness had failed in transit, causing the tanks 
to appear elliptical at the open end and 
resulting in damage to the flanges located 
at the tops of the tanks. Mr. Bevan, upon 
beine informed of these findings, indicated 
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that he would make the necessary repairs 
and install the remaining connections. 
Prior to completion of the job, all six 
tanks were filled with water to test for 
leaks. Four of the six tanks were found to 
have minor leaks. The tank which subse-
quently failed was not one of the four. 
Structo-Lite, upon being informed of the 
leaks, made the necessary repairs. 
Upon completion of the project and prior 
to operation, a seven-day test of the facili-
ties was conducted. The plant, upon pass-
ing the test, was declared ready for opera-
tion. 
Liquid alum w;is poured into one of the 
tanks in May of 1974. The following July a 
tank which subsequently exploded was 
filled with alum. The day after the chemi-
cal was placed in the tank, the plant opera-
tor noticed a minute leak. Before he could 
lessen the pressure, the tank exploded, 
spreading the liquid chemical throughout 
the entire building. Substantial damage to 
the heating and electrical system in the 
plant resulted. 
Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging negli-
gence in the construction of the tanks and 
breach of contract and express warranty 
for failure to construct the tanks according 
to the specifications agreed upon. Structo-
Lite filed a third-party complaint against 
Templeton, Linke and Associates for inade-
quate design and specifications. 
After all testimony was submitted, the 
trial court directed a verdict against Struc-
to-Lite on the ground that the evidence 
showed as a matter of law that the tanks 
had been negligently manufactured. De-
fendant then requested that special inter-
rogatories be submitted to the jury. In 
answer to the interrogatories, the jury 
found Jacobsen-Jelco and Conservancy Dis-
trict had been contributorily negligent and 
had assumed the nsk of the incurred dam-
ages. In apportioning the proximate con-
tribution of each party toward the loss, the 
jury found Structo-Lite 70% liable and Ja-
cobsen-Jelco and Conservancy District 20% 
and 10% responsible, respectively. The jury 
found Templeton, Linke and Associates, 
third-party defendants, not negligent. 
[1] Plaintiffs cross-appeal, contending 
that they were entitled to a finding, as a 
matter of law, that they were not contribu-
torily negligent and that they had not as-
sumed the risk of defendant's negligence 
The evidence show3 that Jacobsen-Jelco 
was aware that the tanks were "out-of-
round," a visual inspection evidencing a 
three to four inch differential in tank diam-
eter from the high to the low spot on the 
tank. Jacobsen-Jelco was also aware of an 
elliptical shape and damaged flanges locat-
ed at the top end of the tanks resulting 
from failure of the bracing supports during 
transit to the water plant. Conservancy 
District noticed during construction of the 
tanks that they did not all have smooth 
surfaces and detected spots where the wo-
ven roving was not covered by the fiber-
glass matting. Further, after installation 
at the plant site, flat spots and irregulari-
ties on the tanks were noticed. 
After the water testing revealed leaks in 
several of the tanks, plaintiffs, knowing 
that alum solution was heavier than water, 
proceeded to fill the tanks with alum solu-
tion without any further testing for tcns;le 
strength. Moreover, testing by the Ameri-
can Testing Laboratories at the direction of 
Jacobsen-Jelco revealed some deficiencies 
in the fabrication of the tanks. P'aintiffs' 
knowledge of these defects must be viewed 
in light of the warranty given by defend-
ants that the tanks would conform to the 
specifications of the general contracf, in 
eluding a tensile strength of 100,000 ps' and 
a flexal strength of 150,000 psi with a "very 
smooth, hard surface and good finishirg 
properties " 
We review the facts and the inferences to 
be drawn therefrom in favor of the veruict 
and conclude that the verdict as to contrib-
utory negligence is supported by the evi-
dence. Furthermore, there is a reasonable 
basis in the evidence to find that plaintiffs 
unreasonably proceeded in light of their 
knowledge and appreciation of fhe risk cre-
ated by defendant, and we thus uphold the 
jury's finding of plaintiffs' assumption of 
risk. 
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[2,3] We next address the contention 
raised by defendant that plaintiffs' assump-
tion of risk should completely bar recovery. 
The term "assumption of risk" has been 
historically defined and applied in different 
ways. Under the circumstances in this 
case, the term "assumption of risk" meant 
the voluntary, yet unreasonable, encounter 
of a known, appreciated risk. The complete 
bar to recovery which such conduct once 
constituted in a negligence action has been 
abolished by the Utah comparative negli-
gence statute to avoid the harshness visited 
upon plaintiffs as a result of the al l -or-
nothing nature of the former rule of law. 
Section 78-27-37 provides: 
Contributory negligence shall not bar re-
covery in an action by any person or his 
legal representative to recover damages 
for negligence or gross negligence result-
ing in death or in injury to person or 
property, if such negligence was not as 
great as the negligence or gross negli-
gence of the person against whom recov-
ery is sought, but any damages allowed 
shall be diminished in the proportion to 
the amount of negligence attributable to 
the person recovering. As used in this 
'act, "contributory negligence" includes 
"assumption of the risk." 
The legislative intent to include assump-
tion of risk within contributory negligence 
terminology and eliminate the use of the 
term is consistent with a recent trend es-
tablished by other courts, legislatures, and 
legal commentators alike. 
The 1973 Oregon Legislature passed the 
Oregon Comparative Negligence Statute 
which is basically identical to Utah's com-
parative negligence statute. Two years la-
ter, in an apparent attempt to clarify its 
intent, the Legislature amended the Act. 
ORS 18.470 Oregon Laws, 1975, Chapter 
599, § 4(2) now reads: "The doctrine of 
implied assumption of the risk is abolished." 
Connecticut has likewise abolished the term 
1. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion 
in i'UL-r v. Atlantic Const Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 
54, 68, 63 S.Ct. 414, 451, 87 L.i£d. 610 (1943), 
commented upon this contusion: 
i he phrase "assumption of risk" is an ex-
feJIr-iu :.'u;- ration oi t!:v extent to which un-
by statute. G.S.C.A. § 52-572h (1973). See 
also North Dakota Statute N.D.C.C. § 9 -
10-46 (1973); Wentz v. Deseth, N.D., 221 
N.W.2d 101 (1974). 
The term "assumption of risk" has caused 
considerable confusion in its indiscriminate 
use.1 Its overuse in the number and variety 
of definitions of the term have brought 
disfavor to the defense, and the trend has 
been to eliminate its use in favor of negli-
gence language. See Keeton, Assumption 
of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 La.L. 
Rev. 122, 123-30 (1961); Prosser, Law of 
Torts § 68 (4th ed. 1971); 2 Harper and 
James, The Law of Torts § 21.1 (1956). 
Feigner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 133 
N.W.2d 136, 148-49 n.4 (1965), quoted Pro-
fessor James: 
"The doctrine of assumption of risk, 
however it is analyzed and defined, is in 
most of its aspects a defendant's doctrine 
which restricts liability and so cuts down 
the compensation of accident victims. It 
is a heritage of the extreme individualism 
of the early industrial revolution. But 
quite aside from any questions of policy 
or of substance, the concept of assuming 
the risk is purely duplicative of other 
more widely understood concepts, such as 
scope of duty or contributory negligence. 
The one exception is to be found, perhaps, 
in those cases where there is an actual 
agreement. Moreover, the expression has 
come to stand for two or three distinct 
notions which are not at all the same, 
though they often overlap in the sense 
that they are applicable to the same situ-
ation. 
"Except for express assumption of risk, 
therefore, the torm and the concept 
should be abolisned. It adds nothing to 
modern law except confusion. For the 
most part the policy of individualism it 
represents is outmoded in accident laws; 
w lie re it is not, that policy can find lull 
critical use of words bedevils the law. A 
phrase begins life a.s a literary expression; its 
felicity leads to i's l,\zy repetition; an J repe-
tition soon estabi.sites it as a legal formula, 
uiidiscriminatingiy used to express different 
and sometimes coi Padictorv ideas. 
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scope and far better expression in other 
language. There is only one thing that 
can be said for assumption of risk. In 
the confusion it introduces, it sometimes-
ironically and quite capriciously-leads to 
a relaxation of an overstrict rule in some 
other field. The aura of disfavor that 
has come to surround it may occasionally 
turn out to be the kiss of death to some 
other bad rule with which it has become 
associated. We have seen how this may 
happen with the burden of pleading and 
proving an exceptional limitation on the 
scope of defendant's duty. There may be 
other instances. But at best this sort of 
thing is a poor excuse indeed for continu-
ing the confusion of an unfortunate form 
of words." 
[James, Assumption of Risk, 61 Yale L.J. 
141, 168-69 (1952).] 
For purposes of analysis, assumption of 
risk is often divided into three categories. 
Those courts which attempt to deal with the 
various concepts subsumed under the one 
label refrain from considering one form, 
that is, the "express" form of assumption of 
risk. See Blackburn v. Dorta, Fla., 343 
So.2d 287, 239 (1977); Meistrich v. Casino 
Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 
9U (1959). An express assumption of risk 
involves a contractual provision in which a 
party expressly contracts not to sue for 
injury or loss which may thereafter be occa-
sioned by the acts of another. We not only 
follow suit by refraining to include this 
form of assumption of risk in our discus-
sion, but furthermore fail to see a necessity 
for including this form within assumption 
of risk terminology. As stated in James, 
Assumption of Risk, 61 Yale L.J. 141 (1952), 
the field of contract law is more than ade-
quate to deal with this bar to recover}'. 
[4] We are thus left with the primary 
and secondary forms of assumption of risk. 
In its primary sense, it is an alternative 
expression for the proposition that defend-
ant was not negligent, that is, there was no 
duty owed or there was no breach of an 
existing duty, in its secondary sense, as-
sumption of risk is an affirmative defense 
to an established breach of duty and as such 
is a phase of contributory negligence. As 
stated in Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attrac-
tions, Inc., supra : 
We here speak solely of the area in 
which injury or damage was neither in-
tended nor expressly contracted to be 
nonactionable. In this area, assumption 
of risk has two distinct meanings. In one 
sense (sometimes called its "primary" 
sense), it is an alternate expression for 
the proposition that defendant was not 
negligent, /. e., either owed no duty or did 
not breach the duty owed. In its other 
sense (sometimes called "secondary"), as-
sumption of risk is an affirmative defense 
to an established breach of duty. In its 
primary sense, it is accurate to say plain-
tiff assumed the risk whether or not he 
was "at fault", for the truth thereby ex-
pressed in alternate terminology is that 
defendant was not negligent. But in its 
secondary sense, /. e., as an affirmative 
defense to an established breach of de-
fendant's duty, it is incorrect to say plain-
tiff assumed the risk whether or not he 
was at fault. 
* * * * * * 
Hence we think it clear that assump-
tion of risk in its secondary sense is a 
mere phase of contributory negligence, 
the total issue being whether a reason-
ably prudent man in the exercise of due 
care (a) would have incurred the known 
risk and (b) if he would, whether si'cn a 
person in the light of all of : h'.1 circum-
stances including the appreciated risk 
would have conducted hims»-if in the 
manner in which plaintiff acted. 
Thus in the area under discussion there 
ar^ but two basic issues: (1) defendant's 
negligence, and (2) plaintiff's contributo-
ry negligence. In view of the considera-
tions discussed above, it tws been urged 
that assumption of risk in both its pri-
mary and secondary senses serves merely 
to confuse and should be eliminated. Ed-
itorial, Assumption of the Risk A False 
Issue, 73 N.J.L.J. 346 (1950); James. As-
sumption of nisk, 61 Yale L.J. 141, 169 
(1952); 2 Harper and James, Law of 
Torts (1956), § 221.8, p. 1191. 
* * * * " « . * 
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Perhaps a well-guarded charge of as-
sumption of risk in its primary sense will 
aid comprehension. But we cannot see 
how a charge of the concept in its second-
ary sense will contribute a net gain. [155 
A.2d at 93, 94-95.] 
The New Jersey court disposed of the last 
vestiges of assumption ol risk four years 
later in McGrath v. American Cyanamid 
Co., 41 N.J. 272, 196 A.2d 238, 239-41 
(1963): 
In Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attrac-
tions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90, 82 
A.L.R.2d 1208 (1959), we pointed out that 
assumption of the risk was theretofore 
used in two incongruous senses: in one 
sense it meant the defendant was not 
negligent, while in its other sense it 
meant the plaintiff was contr ibutory 
negligent. We said that in truth there 
are but two issues-negligence and con-
tributory negligence- both to be resolved 
by the standard of the reasonably pru-
dent man, and that it was erroneous to 
suggest to the jury that assumption of 
the risk was still another issue. 
It was our hop:; that after Meistrich 
the bench and bar would focus upon the 
true issues, but unhappily some cling to 
the terminology of assumption of risk and 
continue to be misled by it even while 
purporting to think of it as merely a 
covertible equivalent of negligence or 
contributory negligence. 
* * * * * * 
In Meistrich we said tho terminology of 
assumption of the risk should not be used 
when it is projected in its secondary 
sense, i. e., that of contributory negli-
gence (31 N . J , at p. 55, 155 A.2d at p. 96, 
82 A.L.R.2d 1208). We thought, however, 
that '[pjerhaps a well-guarded charge of 
assumption of risk in its primary sense 
will aid comprehension' (31 N.J. p. 54, 155 
A.2d p. 9C, 82 A.L.R.2d 1208). * * * Ex-
perience, however, indicates the term 'as-
sumption of risk' is so apt to create mist 
that it is better banished from the scene. 
We hope we have heard the last of it. 
Henceforth let us stay with "negligence" 
and "contributory negligence." 
The New Jersey decisions quoted above 
have been cited approvingly by several jur-
isdictions adopting the same approach. 
Leavitt v. Gillaspie, Alaska, 443 P.2d 61 
(1968); Fawcett v. Irby, 92 Idaho 48, 436 
P.2d 714 (1968) (Spear, J , concurring spe-
cially); Feigner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 
133 N.W.2d 136 (1965); Williamson v. 
Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1972). 
Other courts have likewise abolished the use 
of assumption of risk terminology, accept-
ing the argument that assumption of risk 
serves no purpose which is not served either 
by the doctrine of contributory negligence 
or the common law concept of duty. Bol-
duc v. Crain, 104 N.H. 163, 181 A.2d 641 
(1962); McConviUe v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Ins. Co., 15 Wis.2d 374, 113 
N.W.2d 14 (1962). See also Petrone v. Mar-
golis, 20 N.J.Super. 180, 89 A.2d 476 (1952). 
The policy set forth in our comparative 
negligence act parallels this trend. This 
Court was faced with construing the as-
sumption of risk doctrine in light of our 
comparative negligence act in Rigtrup v. 
Strawberry Water Users Association, Utah, 
56:j P.:«\ 1247 (1977). The Court recognized 
th( various forms of conduct subsumed un-
der assumption of risk terminology but indi-
cated that retention of the term comported 
with the statute and that the term, properly 
construed, was not inconsistent with the 
comparative fault concept. 
Whi.t is important is the concept embod-
ied in the comparative neglige-nce statute, 
and the particular labels assigned to the 
type of fault involved should not interfere 
therewith. The Court in Rigtrup alluded to 
this form of analysis by focusing on the 
underlying conduct rather than the tradi-
tional lerminology in the following state-
ment: 
[Assumption of risk) has sometimes been 
said to be but a specialized aspect of 
contributory negligence in that it can be 
intermingled and fused with other as-
pects thereof in certain circumstances. It 
is also sometimes said to be something 
separate from contributory negligence, as 
ii undoubtedly can be in some circum-
stances. However, it requires but little 
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reflection to see that where there is a 
known danger, the risk of which is volun-
tarily assumed by a party, such action 
may well fall within the lack of due care 
which constitutes negligence and also 
may be correctly termed an assumption 
of risk. If such be the situation, the 
pnrty should be clvirgvd with the respon-
sibility for his conduct, by whatever term 
it may be called; and the comparative 
negligence statute quoted above should 
be applied as the trial court correctly did 
in this case. [Footnotes omitted; empha-
sis added.) [563 P.2d at 1250.] 
[5, 6] We thus hold that under our com-
parative negligence statute "assumption of 
risk" language is not appropriate to de-
scribe the various concepts previously dealt 
with under that terminology but is to be 
treated, in its secondary sense, as contribu-
tory negligence. Specifically, and with par-
ticular reference to our comparative negli-
gence act, the reasonableness of plaintiff's 
conduct in confronting a known or un-
known risk created by defendant's negli-
gence will basically be determined under 
principles of contributory negligence.2 At-
tention should be focused on whether a 
reasonably prudent man in the exercise of 
due carJ would have incurred the risk, de-
spite his knowledge of it, and if so, whether 
h" would have conducted himself in the 
manner in which the plaintiff acted in light 
ol all the surrounding circumstances, in-
cluding the appreciated risk. See Leavitt v. 
Gillaspie, supra. Then, if plaintiffs unrea-
sonableness is viewed to be less than that of 
defendant, according to the terms of the 
statute, "any damages allowed shall be di-
minished in proportion to the amount of 
negligence attributable to the person recov-
ering." 
[7] Defendants next contend that PS-
sumption of risk should stand as a bar to 
recovery for breach of express warranty. 
2. When there is a knowing and express oral or 
written consent to the dangerous activity or 
condition, a contractual theory will suffice to 
l>ar recovery. 
3. We also note that this Court in Ernest W. 
Ilnhn, inc. v. Annco .V'\W Co., Utah, GUI P.2d 
!">'.': i!97!f\ s t a t ed in <!<• turn tha t one w h o un-
In Vernon v. Lake Motors, 26 Utah 2d 269, 
488 P.2d 302 (1971), this Court held that a 
plaintiff who deliberately and unreasonably 
uses a product which he knows to be defec-
tive is precluded from recovering damages 
in an action for breach of express warran-
ty.3 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the 
principles of comparative fault should be 
extended to breach of warranty cases. Pur-
suant to that theory damages would be re-
duced to the extent of plaintiffs contribu-
tion to the fault. But no such proposal is 
before the Court, and we refrain from reap-
praising the status of the law as to assump-
tion of risk as a defense to breach of ex-
press warranty. 
In this case the jury apportioned by per-
centage the fault of each party without 
differentiating between the negligence and 
breach of express warranty causes of ac-
tion. Since the same conduct of defendant 
constituted both negligence and breach of 
warranty, and since the jury was instructed 
that tho damages resulting from the breach 
of warranty were the same as for negli-
gence, the finding of assumption of risk 
applies equally to both the negligence and 
warranty claims. 
As to the remaining issues, we hold that 
the trial court acted within the confines of 
sound discretion on all counts. 
The judgment of the district court is af-
firmed. Costs to Respondents. 
MAUGHAN and WILKINS, JJ., concur. 
HALL, J., concurs in result. 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice (concurring in 
result). 
I must confess my inability to see either 
necessity or desirability in the main opin-
ion's treatment of what impresses me as an 
reasonably proceeds to make use of a product 
which he knows to be dangerous cannot recov-
er under a strict products liability theory or 
breach of implied warranty theory. The Court 
did not address the issue of whether compara-
tive fault had any applicability in such a case. 
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effort to discredit the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk in order to decide this case. It 
is my view that the trial court gave a 
correct and appropriate instruction as ap-
plied to the evidence. That is sufficient to 
dispose of the issue. 
Though it may be true that assumption of 
risk is but a specialized aspect of contribu-
tory negligence, it has its uses in more 
closely focusing attention upon certain fact 
situations.1 The broad principle which un-
derlies contributory negligence is that the 
plaintiff fails to use reasonable care for his 
own safety. A particular aspect thereof is 
where he knows of a danger, and has a 
reasonable opportunity to make an alterna-
tive choice, but nevertheless voluntarily 
proceeds and assumes the risk of harm.2 
This Court has but recently dealt with 
this problem in Rigtrup v. Strawberry 
Water Users Ass'n? wherein we stated: 
Plaintiffs urge that inasmuch as the 
trial court had adequately instructed on 
contributory negligence, it was error to 
also instruct on assumption of risk. They 
argue that this defense is spurious and 
should be abolished, citing cases from 
states where they assert that has been 
done by judicial declaration.* We do not 
so read those cases. They deal for the 
most part with whether there are mean-
ingful distinctions between contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk. How-
soever that might be, we decline the invi-
tation to so change our law. One of the 
important values in our system which 
tends to produce confidence in and re-
spect for the law is that the Jaw as it is 
declared and known has sufficient soli-
darity and continuity that it can be relic! 
on with assurance. We think that those 
objectives are best served by the judicial 
branch refraining from legislating any 
abrupt or dramatic changes of a substan-
tial nature in the law and by leaving any 
such changes therein to the legislature, 
whose constitutional prerogative it is.* 
1. See discussion by Justice Henriod, speaking 
for the Court, in Cluy v. Duntbrd, et a/., 121 
Utah 177, 239 P.2d 1075 (1952). 
2. See Jacques v. Farrimnnd, 14 Utah 2d 1GG, 
380 i'.2,: i33 (1SGJ). citing PLOSS-.T on Torts, p. 
Though there have been some differ-
ences in view as to the defense of as-
sumption of risk and its relation to other 
aspects of contributory negligence, it has 
since time immemorial been regarded as 
a valid defense in the law of this State. 
That our conclusion just stated is the 
correct one under our law is supported, 
not only by the reasoning just stated and 
the cases cited, but is made abundantly 
clear by the fact that the legislature, 
apparently in order to avoid any misun-
derstanding thereon, appended the last 
sentence as quoted above that: as used in 
this act, "contributory negligence1' in-
cludes "assumption of the risk." That 
sentence indicates a clear legislative in-
tent to recognize the doctrine of "as-
sumption of risk" as an aspect of contrib-
utory negligence in Utah law. Therefore 
any attempt on our part to judicially 
abolish thai defense would amount to a 
direct repudiation of the legislative ex-
pression and thus a clear usurpation of 
ihe l e g i s l a t e prerogative. * * * See ci-
tations in original. [Emphasis added.] 
In accordance with what has been :;aid 
above, I do n<-t join in the main opinion's 
treatment of what I regard as the t ime-
honored and, in some instances, useful doc-
trine of assumption of risk; first, because I 
do not think \hat treatment is necessary to 
the correct and satisfactory disposition of 
this case; c+nd second, because I think the 
previous decisions of this Court are sound 
and useful applications of the law to the 
particular fact situations and that others 
will likely continue to occur in the future. 
311; Johnson v. Maynard. 9 Utah 2d 268. 342 
P.2d 884 U9.\;"). 
3. Utah, 563 P 2c! 1247 (1977). 
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formed by the prmcipa1 emplover's own 
employees in the prosecution of its busi-
ness, or as an essential part in the main-
tenance thereof, it is a part or process of 
his work/' 
Id. at 1131 (quoting King v Palmer, 129 
Conn. 636, o41, 30 A.2d 549, 552 (1943)). 
Moreover, if the work performed is a part 
or process of the employer's business, an 
inference arises that the employer has re-
tained supervision and control over the 
work. Bennett, 726 P.2d at 432. 
In construing the wage payment statute 
to include both contractor-subcontractor's 
employee relationships and statutory em-
ployer-employee relationships, we give a 
broader construction to the wage payment 
statute than it had prior to the 1941 amend-
ment, as the Legislature clearly intended, 
and at the same time, we avoid an unrea-
sonably broad construction. This interpre-
tation is also consistent with the express 
language of wage payment statutes of oth-
er states. See Del.Code Ann. tit. 19, 
§ 1105 (1985); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 275:46 
(1977); Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 40, § 165.6 
(West 1986); W.Va.Code § 21-5-7 (1985). 
See also Kan.Stat.Ann. § 44-317 (1986); 
'Nev.Rev.Stat. § 608.150 (1986). 
The Industrial Commission concedes that 
this interpretation is reasonable, but it con-
tends that a question of fact exists as to 
whether the construction of condominium 
units is part or process of the trade or 
business of RDG. We agree. RDG is not 
a licensed contractor, but the question 
whether constructing condominium units 
could be construed to be a part or process 
of RDG's trade or business is a question of 
fact that must be resolved by the trial 
court. Accordingly, further proceedings 
are necessary. 
Reversed and remanded. 
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
HOWE, J., concurs in the result. 
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Joan F. STEPHENS, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Brent HENDERSON, dba Classic 
Skating Center, and John Doe, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 860440. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 13, 1987. 
Patron of roller rink brought negli-
gence action against owner. Patron was 
awarded damages following judgment on a 
jury verdict in the Fourth District Court, 
Utah County, Cullen Y. Christensen, J., and 
owner appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Howe, J., held that: (1) newly enacted Lia-
bility Reform Act redefining relationship 
between injured party and joint tort-fea-
sors, could not be retroactively applied; (2) 
assumption-of-risk language is not appro-
priate in instruction under comparative 
negligence statutes, but was to be treated 
as contributory negligence; and (3) instruc-
tion on owner's duty to protect patron from 
tripping was not different from duty to 
protect patron from other negligent or 
reckless injury, and was properly refused 
as surplusage. 
Affirmed. 
1. Statutes <3=>266 
Theaters and Shows <s=>3.80 
Statute eliminating joint and several 
liability could not be applied to a negli-
gence action brought by roller rink patron 
for injuries occurring prior to statute's ef-
fective date, in that statute changed sub-
stantive law in effect when cause of action 
arose, creating retroactive effect if applied, 
and legislature did not expressly direct ret-
roactive effect. U.C.A.1953, 68-3-3, 78-
27-37 to 78-27-43; U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37 
to 78-27-43 (Repelled). 
STEPHENS v. 
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2. Statutes c^266 
Party may not be deprived of statutori-
ly created right simply because judgment 
has not been entered, by determining that 
change in substantive law is not retroactive 
if new statute takes effect before entry of 
final judgment. U.C.A.1953, 68-3-3. 
3. Negligence 0^141(12) 
Assumption-of-risk language is not ap-
propriate in jury instruction under compa-
rative negligence statute, but assumption 
of the risk in the secondary sense is to be 
treated as contributory negligence. 
4. Theaters and Shows <2>6(7, 39) 
Duty of roller rink owner to protect 
patron from those who intentionally trip 
her was not different than duty to protect 
patron from those who negligently or reck-
lessly run into her, and jury instruction 
regarding intentionally tripping was prop-
erly refused as surplusage. 
Carman E. Kipp, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendants and appellants. 
Ray Harding Ivie. Ray Phillips Ivie and 
James G. Cbrk, Provo, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
HOWE, Justice-
This is an appeal f»*om a judgment on a 
jury verdict in a negligence action. De-
fondant Brent Henderson dba Classic Skat-
ing Center asserts that the trial judge com-
mitted reversible error in refusing to give 
certain jury instructions requested by him 
and in refusing to apply the provisions of 
the Liability Reform Act. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-27-37 to -43 as amended in 1986. 
On November 8, 1984, plaintiff Joan Ste-
phens injured her wrist when she fell after 
being tripped by an unknown skater while 
she was roller skating at Classic Skating 
Center in Orem, Utah. Stephens filed suit, 
naming Henderson and "John Doe" as de-
fendants. Trial was held on July 29; 1986. 
At the close of plaintiffs case, Henderson's 
counsel moved to apply the Liability Re-
form Act, which became effective April 28, 
1986. Application of the Act would have 
held each defendant liable for damages 
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only in proportion to his own individual 
fault. The trial court denied the motion. 
The court also refused to give certain in-
structions requested by Henderson. The 
jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the 
amount of $17,357.92, finding John Doe 75 
percent negligent, Henderson/Classic Skat-
ing Center 25 percent negligent, and plain-
tiff free from any negligence. On August 
15, 1986, plaintiff executed against 
Henderson for the entire amount of the 
judgment. 
In 1986, the legislature repealed the 
Comparative Negligence Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-27-37 to -43, and replaced it 
with the Liability Reform Act. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-27-37 t* -43, as reenacted. 
The Liability Reform Act did not expressly 
direct that any of its provisions should op-
erate retroactively. Section 78-27-40 of 
that Act provides in part: "[T]he maximum 
amount for which a defendant may be lia-
ble to any person seeking recovery is that 
percentage or proportion of the damages 
equivalent to the percentage or proportion 
of fault attributed to that defendant." In 
contrast, the Comparative Negligence Act 
provided for joint and several liability, that 
is, each defendant vas liable to the plain-
tiff for the full amount of the plaintiffs 
damages. 
Henderson conterds that the Liability 
Reform Act, eliminating joint and several 
liability, should have been applied in Hiis 
case. On the other hand, Stephens asserts 
that doing so would have effected an im-
permissible retroactive result. 
[1] The starting point for our analysis 
is Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3, which pro-
vides: "No part of these revised statutes is 
retroactive, unless expressly so declared." 
The application of a statute is retroactive if 
it alters the substantive law on which the 
parties relied. See Docutel Olivetti Corp. 
v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475 
(Utah 1986); see also Petty v. Clark, 113 
Utah 205, 192 P.2d 589 (1948); cf. Archer v. 
Utah State Land Board, 15 Utah 2d 321, 
392 P.2d 622 (1964). Law is substantive if 
it "creates, defines and regulates the rights 
and duties of the parties and . . . may give 
rise to a cause for action, as distinguished 
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from adjective law which pertains to and 
prescribes the practice and procedure or 
the legal machinery by which the substan-
tive law is determined or made effective." 
Petty v. Clark, 192 P 2d at 593-94. Other 
jurisdictions have held similar statutes to 
be substantive. Russell v. Superior 
Court, 185 Cal.App.3d 810, 230 Cal.Rptr. 
102 (Cal.App. 1st Dist 1986) (holding Propo-
sition 51, which eliminated joint and several 
liability for noneconomic damages, to have 
prospective effect only); see also United 
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Park 
City Corp., 397 F.Supp. 411, 414-15 (D.Or. 
1973) ("[T]he relationship between the par-
ties is fixed as of the date of the accident. 
It is at that time that these parties became 
joint tortfeasors. Their rights and obli-
gations as among themselves are governed 
by the then existing substantive law "), 
affd, 526 F?d 1120 (9th Cir.1975). 
In the instant case, the Comparative 
Negligence Act was the substantive law 
defining, m part, the relationship between 
the parties a. the time of the accident. 
Section 78-27-41 provided "Nothing in this 
act shall affect: (1) the common-law liabili-
ty of the several joint tort-feasors to have 
,udgment recovered, ard payment made, 
fiom them IPOP ,duaibr by the injured per-
son for the whole injury." The Liability 
Reform Act rcdefne^ the relationship be-
tween the plaintiff and the joint tort-fea-
cort3. Since the Act changes the substan-
ti\ e law in effect when plaintiffs cause of 
action arose, its application would have ret-
roactive effect. That being the case, sec-
tion 68-3-3 dictates that it may not be 
applied unless expressly so directed by the 
legislature. The Liability Reform Act con-
tains no such express direction. 
[2] We note Henderson's argument for 
c n alternate method to determine if a legis-
lative act is retroactive. He asserts that 
there is no retroactive effect if a new stat-
ute takes effect before judgment is entered 
in the case. However, we have long held 
that a party may not be deprived of a right 
simply because judgment has not yet been 
entered. To paraphrase our holding in 
Buttrey v. Guaranteed Securities Co., 78 
U*-ih 39, 300 P. 1040 (1931\ a case involv-
ing the repeal of a statute holding corpo-
rate directors individually liable to stock-
holders, cases which hold that a statutorily 
created right can be destroyed at any time 
until final judgment because the right has 
not yet vested, are in error Id at 1045 
To allow the substantive law m a case to be 
changed at any time up until entry of final 
judgment would allow a plaintiff to be ef-
fectively deprived of a cause of action 
Campbell v. Stagg, 596 P2d 1037 (Utah 
1979), cited by Henderson as authority, is 
inapposite. In that case, we were present-
ed with the question whether it was per-
missible to include interest on a judgment 
for a plaintiffs damages from the time of 
the injury, even though the statute allow-
ing such interest became effective after the 
accident giving rise to the injuries. In 
holding that result permissible, we noted 
that the legislature "explicitly directed all 
[future] judgments to add interest comput-
ed from the time of the act giving rise to 
the accident." Id. at 1042. There is no 
analogous statutory language in the Lnbil 
ity Reform Act. 
Our determination that application of the 
Liability Reform Act would be impermissi-
bly retroactive ir this case is reinforced by 
out decision in Brunyrr v. Salt Lah 
County, 551 P.2d 5*1 (Utah 1976) In that 
case, we were confronted with whether t 
Comparative Negligence Act should apply 
to allow contribution between tort-feasors 
who had negligently injured the plaintiff 
before the effective date of the act. We 
held that since the right to contribution 
arose by statute after the accident, the 
statu-e creating the right could not apply 
Our holding in that case was reiterated in 
Umgc d Insurance Co v. City of La\ er 
kin, 689 P.2d 1344 (dtah 1984), where ue 
stated that Brunyer stands for the proposi-
tion that "the oct was not applicable m any 
resoect to any liability for injuries occur-
ring prior to the effect [sic] date of the 
statute/' Id. at 1347 n. 3. A statute elimi-
nating joint and several liability may not be 
applied to injuries occurring prior to its 
effective date. The injuries in this case 
occurred on November 8, 1984; the Liabili-
ty Reform Act was not effective until April 
28, 1986. Therefore, the trial court was 
STEPHENS v. 
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correct in holding that the Liability Reform 
Act did not apply. 
[3] Henderson next contends that the 
trial court erred in failing to give his re-
quested jury instruction No. 21: 
There is a legal principle, commonly 
referred to by the term "assumption of 
risk", which is as follows: 
One is said to assume a risk when he 
voluntarily manifests his assent to a dan-
gerous condition or to the creation or 
maintenance of a dangerous condition 
and voluntarily exposes himself to that 
danger, or when he knows, or in the 
exercise of ordinary care would know, 
that a danger exists in the condition of 
the property and voluntarily places him-
self or remains within the position of 
danger. 
If you find that Joan Stephens as-
sumed the risks which were known by 
her or which should have been known by 
her concerning the dangers associated 
with roller skating, she would be guilty 
of negligence. 
We held in Jacobsen Construction Co. v. 
Structo-Lite Engineering, 619 P.2d 306 
(Utah 1980), that assumption-of-risk lan-
guage is not appropriate under our compa-
rative negligence statutes. As was illus-
trated by that case, assumption of the risk 
in its secondary sense, as used in the re-
quested instruction, is to be treated as con-
tributory negligence. Id. at 312. The jury 
was given instructions on contributory neg-
ligence; therefore, the trial court was cor-
rect in refusing defendant's requested in-
struction No. 21. 
[4] Henderson lastly contends that the 
trial court erred in refusing to give his 
requested instruction No. 27, which read: 
Should you determine that the plaintiff 
was deliberately knocked down, you are 
instructed that a roller skating proprietor 
has a duty to guard roller skaters 
against assaults by fellow roller skaters 
if the circumstances are such that an 
ordinarily prudent person might reason-
ably anticipate the danger of such as-
saults and knew or should have known of 
the tendency of a fellow skater to assault 
other pr.trons of the establishment. 
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Henderson points out that plaintiff's friend 
who accompanied her to the roller rink 
testified that the unknown skater, after 
knocking plaintiff down, yelled, "I scored 
another." She further testified that she 
had seen him knock down another skater 
moments before he made contact with 
plaintiff. Henderson argues that this testi-
mony indicates that plaintiff was intention-
ally assaulted and that consequently re-
quested instruction No. 27 was necessary 
to instruct the jury as to the duty 
Henderson owed plaintiff to protect her 
against intentional torts by other patrons. 
We find no prejudicial error in the refus-
al to give this instruction. It is true, as 
asserted by Henderson, that a proprietor, 
to be held liable, must have some cause to 
believe that one patron may assault anoth-
er patron. Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 
693 (Utah 1982). Nevertheless, under the 
facts here such an instruction was not re-
quired since the instructions given covered 
this subject. Henderson had two floor 
guards assigned to monitor the skating and 
to warn or remove those skaters who in-
dulged in unsafe practices, such as racing, 
pushing, or rowdy behavior. The instruc-
tions given by the court informed the jury 
that it was the theory of plaintiffs case 
that Henderson was negligent because his 
floor guards failed to properly supervise 
the skating of other patrons of the rink. 
The jury was further instructed that the 
proprietor of a public amusement has the 
duty to use ordinary care and diligence to 
protect patrons, but this duty does not ex-
tend to becoming an insurer of their safety. 
Negligence was defined. Under the facts 
of this case, Henderson's duty to protect 
plaintiff irom those who wouM intentional-
ly trip her was not different than the duty 
to protect her from those who would negli-
gently or recklessly run into her. The 
floor guards were there to monitor all ska-
ters. Requested instruction No. 27 was 
properly refused as suiplusage since other 
instructions adequately covered the duty 
owed to plaintiff to protect her from the 
errant conduct of other skaters, irrespec-
tive of how that conduct might je charac-
terized. This case is unlike Gustaveson v. 
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Gregg, supra, where the desk clerk in a 
bowling alley who had no responsibility to 
monitor the conduct of patrons had no rea-
son to believe that an argument might 
erupt between two patrons and that one 
might punch the other in the face. In that 
case, we held the proprietor not liable as a 
matter of law. In the instant case, the 
peril was foreseeable, even anticipated, and 
floor guards were assigned to watch for 
and immediately stop the very conduct 
which injured plaintiff. 
Affirmed. 
HALL, C.J, DURHAM and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ.f and GREGORY K. 
ORME, Court of Appeals Judge, 
concur. 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice, 
does not participate herein; ORME, 
Court of Appeals Judge, sat. 
Dennis CLARK & Darla Clark dba Dis-
count Bail Bonding, Ed Tolman & Va-
lene Tolman dba Ed Tolman Bail Bond-
ing Company, and H.C. Heninger & 
Doris Heninger dba H.C. Heninger Bail 
Bonding Company, Plaintiffs and Ap-
pellants, 
v. 
SECOND CIRCUIT COU?.T, STATE OF 
UTAH, CACHE COUNTY, Second Cir-
cuit Court, State of Utah, Rich County, 
Ted S. Perry, Circuit Judge, and David 
W. Sorenson, Circuit Judge, Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. 21062. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 18, 1987. 
Circuit judge, on own initiative, forfeit-
ed bail posted for three defendants and 
entered judgment against bail bondsman 
on those bonds. Affected bail bondsman 
and other bail bondsmen filed petition for 
extraordinary writ challenging bail forfei-
tures. The day after petition was filed, 
another Circuit Court judge delivered letter 
to sheriff prohibiting all petitioners from 
posting bail in that circuit, while petition 
was pending in court. Bail bondsmen re* 
ceived no notice of this action. The First 
District Court, Cache County, John F. 
Wahlquist, J., dismissed the petition. Bail 
bondsmen other than the one whose bonds 
were forfeited appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Stewart, Associate C.J., held that: 
(1) appellants had no standing to appeal 
forfeiture of first bail bondsman's bonds, 
and (2) extraordinary writ should have been 
granted. 
Pveversed in part, and remanded; dis-
missed in part. 
1. Appeal and Error <3=>877(3) 
Bail bondsmen appealing revocation of 
bail bonding authority did not have stand-
ing to appeal the forfe'ture of bonds of 
another bail bondsman, v.'ho was party to 
lower court suit, but did not join on appeal. 
2. Courts <$=>209(2) 
Bail bondsmen had standing to chal-
lenge propriety of judge's letter prohibiting 
them, without prior notice from posting 
bonds in circuit court during pendency of 
district court action, although petition for 
extraordinary writ in lower court did not 
attack the letter or seel: release from its 
effect, where the issues concerning letter 
were in fact raised, tried by consent, and 
adjudicated in lower court's findings and 
conclusions. 
3. Courts <3=>207.1 
Prohibition $»3(1) 
Relief by extraordinary writ was ap-
propriate where circuit nourt judge wrote 
letter to sheriff terminating bail bonds-
men's ability to post bonds, without notice 
or hearing. 
A.W. Lauritzen, Logan, for plaintiffs and 
appellants. 
Ernestina MARTIN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
SAFEWAY STORES INCORPORATED, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 14492. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 20, 1977. 
Action was brought to recover damages 
for broken leg resulting from fall on side-
walk leading from parking lot of grocery 
store to main entrance of store. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal 
Taylor, J., granted defendant's motion for 
directed verdict and plaintiff appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Swan, J., held that 
where store employees had shoveled snow 
and cleaned and salted sidewalk at 2:00 p. 
m. and again at 5:00 p. m., and icy spot on 
which plaintiff fell at approximately 9:30 p. 
m., after the store had closed, was only 12 
inches by 14 inches in area, store employees 
hard met their duty in making the sidewalk 
reasonably safe. 
Affirmed. 
Wilkins, J., concurred in result. 
Maughan, J., dissented. 
1. Negligence <®=>32(1) 
Property owners are not insurers of the 
safety of those who come upon their proper-
ty, even though they are business invitees. 
2. Negligence s=>48 
Liability of owner of store for injury to 
customers should be established only when 
the condition complained of has existed for 
a long enough time that the owner should 
have known about it and corrected it, or has 
had actual knowledge of the condition com-
plained of. 
3. Municipal Corporations <$=* 808(5) 
It is not the duty of persons in control 
of stores, banks, office buildings, theaters 
or other buildings where the public is invit-
MAKTIN v. SAFEWAY STORES INC. Utah H 3 9 
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ed to come on business or for pleasure to 
mop the sidewalk dry or take other steps 
necessary to prevent the accumulation of 
moisture on the sidewalk that might freeze 
and create an icv condition. 
4. Negligence <3=>50 
Where store employees had shoveled 
snow and cleaned and salted sidewalk lead-
ing from parking lot to store at 2:00 p. m. 
and again at 5:00 p. m., and icy spot on 
which plaintiff fell at approximately 9:30 p. 
m., after the store had closed, was only 12 
inches by 14 inches in area, store employees 
had met their duty in making the sidewalk 
reasonably safe. 
5. Appeal and Error <£=> 970(2) 
Evidence <8=>143 
In matters of determining materiality 
of evidence the trial court should be accord-
ed a large measure of discretion and should 
only be reversed if this discretion is abused. 
6. Negligence $=> 124(1) 
In action for injury sustained in fall on 
ice on store's sidewalk, trial judge did not 
abu^e his discretion in excluding summary 
of weather condition at airport some 20 
miles away from the store. 
7. Negligence <3=> 136(22) 
Evidence as to sufficiency of lighting 
of sidewalk of defendant's store where 
plaintiff fell at approximately 9:30 p. m. 
was insufficient to take the case to the 
jury. 
Mark S. Miner, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff and appellant. 
Merlin R. Lybbert of Snow, Christensen 
& Martineau, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
and respondent. 
SWAN, District Judge: 
This is an action for personal injury 
brought by Ernestina Martin, the plaintiff 
1140 Utah 565 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
and appellant herein, to recover damages 
for a broken leg resulting from a fall on a 
sidewalk leading from the parking lot of 
Safeway Stores to the main entrance of its 
grocery store. At the conclusion of the 
evidence Safeway Stores, Incorporated, the 
defendant and respondent herein, moved 
for a directed verdict which the trial court 
granted, and it is from that ruling that the 
appeal to this Court is taken. 
It is uncontroverted that or. January 13, 
1975, at approximately 9:30 p. m., and after 
defendant's employees had closed the store 
for the day's business, the plaintiff and her 
husband, Abraham Martin, drove their car 
to defendant's grocery store and parked in 
the parking lot in a space adjoining the 
sidewalk that leads to the main entrance of 
the store. The plaintiff and her husband 
had been married in Mexico a few days 
before, and piaint:.Ts husband had brought 
plaintiff to his home in Salt Lake City and 
later had gone to the store intending to 
purchase some groceries. 
The evidence shows that it had been 
snowing intermittently throughout the day 
and that the Safeway employees had shov-
eled the snow and cleaned and salted the 
sidewalk at 2:00 o'clock p. m. and again at 
5:09 o'clock p. m. It was the practice of 
defendant's employees to keep the sidewalk 
as clean as possible to avoid water being 
tracked into the store that would later have 
to be mopped up. 
After plaintiff's husband parked the car, 
the plaintiff got out on the passenger side 
in an area that was covered with snow and 
ice. She proceeded onto the sidewalk and 
toward the main entrance of the store. The 
evidence at trial was conflicting as to exact-
ly where the plaintiff fell, but the evidence 
taken in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff indicates that she fell at a place on 
the sidewalk where there was a slight spall-
ing or flaking of the concrete. After she 
fell, the plaintiff's husband helped her back 
to the car and then went to the front door 
of the store which was locked. He got the 
attention of the defendant's inventory clerk 
and a customer who was still at the check-
out counter and they went to the place 
where plaintiff had fallen and with the aid 
of a flashlight found an icy spot about 
twelve to fourteen inches in diameter. It 
was this spot of ice that plaintiff contends 
was the cause of plaintiff's fall and for 
which the defendant should be held liable. 
[1, 2] This court has held that property 
owners are not insurers of the safety of 
those who come upon their property, even 
though they are business invitees. The lia-
bility of the owner of a store should be 
established only when the condition com-
plained of has existed for a long enough 
time that the owner should have known 
about it and corrected it, or has had actual 
knowledge of the condition complained of. 
Here the plaintiff failed to produce any 
evidence to show that the danger had exist-
ed for any period of time prior to the acci-
dent. The evidence is without dispute that 
snow had fallen during the day, that em-
ployees of the defendant shoveled the walk-
way on t.vo occasions '.nd that the walk 
was salted on each occasion. Thereafter 
the sidewalk was wet but not icy, and the 
defendant's courtesy clerk testified that he 
had walked past the area where the acci-
dent occurred some twenty to thirty times 
and had observed it to be wet but had not 
observed the presence of any ice. 
The plaintiff presented no evidence to 
show the temperature or when the freezing 
could have occurred, and the only reasona-
ble inference that could be drawn from the 
evidence is that the ice formed at a time 
and place where it was not observed by 
defendant's employees or any customers, or 
that the freezing occurred after the store 
employees could reasonably have expected 
customers to come to the store. The plain-
tiff's husband testified that the ice was 
clear and was the same color as the side-
walk and could not be seen, and all of the 
other witnesses concurred in this observa-
tion. 
[3] The essential inquiry relating to de-
fendant's negligence is whether the defend-
ant's employees know, or in the exercise of 
ordinary care should have known, that a 
dangerous condition existed, and whether 
sufficient time elapsed thereafter that ac-
tion could have beer 
situation. Owners of stores, banks, office 
buildings, theaters or other buildings where 
the public is invited to come on business or 
for pleasure are not insurers against all 
forms of accidents that may happen to any 
who come. It is not the duty of persons in 
control of such buildings to mop the side-
walk dry or take other steps necessary to 
prevent the accumulation of moisture on 
the sidewalk that might freeze and create 
an icv condition. It is significant to note 
tin1 the icy spot complained of was only 
twelve inches by fourteen inches in area, 
and the evidence shows that the area where 
the spalling occurred was much larger than 
the icy area described by the witnesses. 
The plaintiff's physicist conducted an ex-
periment and found that \ ater would only 
accumulate to a depth of one-fourth inch in 
the ^palling area before running off the 
sidewalk, a^d it cannot be the duty of per-
sons in control of su^h biddings to seek out 
and mop d^v all <uch depressions in the 
waPxWa}s and approaches to such buildings. 
[11 The trial courf found that defendant 
had laVr>n all reasonable precautions to 
keep th<> walkwav clean ^ of snow, and 
saltc*1 -md could not be charged with a duty 
of k'epimr the sidewa'1; ' \ and free from 
ice p\ MI af'er the jme for ' 1 )siMg the store. 
TV *rul court * 'tenuis that as a matter 
of la ' reasonable i >ncK
 v-("' 1 not differ in 
fi dino- that the de'2nd?nt's employees had 
n *jt 5 c r iUty under the circumstance in 
mining *h n'dewnlk *vasonably safe, and 
that »v> Q\ i lence was presented as to how 
long t ne ice was pr^en: oi that the employ-
ees of the -tore Ind or in thf exercise of 
reasonable care co"l' have had notice of the 
cond'Hon ' nd an opportunity to correct it. 
It is our opinion t\ °t the evidence justifies 
the trial court so ruling a^  a matter of law. 
See be Wcese v J C. Penney Co, 5 Utah 
2d 116, 297 P.2d ^ 3 . 
The plaintiff offered an exhibit showing 
the weather conditions at the Salt Lake 
City \irport or the month of January of 
1975. The trial court sustained an objection 
to the exmbit on the grounds that an exhib-
it th-U suhi'nam >d *he weather condition at 
MAP-HX v SAFEW4Y STORES JNC. Utah H 4 1 
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\V( n to correct the the Salt Lake Airport is immaterial to 
prove the weather condition at Midvale 
some twenty miles away. Throop v. F. E. 
Young & Co., 94 Ariz. 146, 382 P.2d 560 
(1963); Tucker v. Lower, 200 Kan. 1, 434 
P.2d 320 (1967); Gunderson v. Brewster, 
154 Mont. 405, 466 P.2d 589 (1970); Carter 
v. Moberly, 263 Or. 193, 501 P 2d 1276 
(1972). 
The Utah Rules of Evidence provide: 
Rule 45. The judge may in his discretion 
exclude evidence if he finds that its 
probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the risk that its admission 
will . . . 
(b) create substantial danger of undue 
prejudice or of confusing the issues or 
of misleading the jury. 
This Court held in De Weesc v. J. C 
Penney Co., (supra) 
It is recognized that in this mountain 
valley storms are sometimes spotty and 
inegular as to time and place of starting, 
duration and amount of precipitation. 
5 Utah 2d at 122, 297 t 2d at 902. 
If plaintiff's attorney felt that it was 
necessary to prove what the weather was 
on T iTii-ry 13, 1975 in the area of the store, 
he id a\ailable ample direct means by 
que Mon'ng witnesses who were present 
and conce ned with the v eathjr on the dav 
of 'l< evident. 
T V la-[5, *i] Th< l - is clef r that in matters of 
detenn-ninpr matana'ib the trai court 
should b^ accoried d l ^ e measure of d'a-
cretif; and .^ hoidc, only ui reversed if this 
discretion is abused The weather report 
oflerel ?^ r> hibit "4-P ' had very si'Jlj, if 
any, proljati-e value a id it ^uM have Cro-
at d a substantia' *sk of confusing the 
issues. The judge oi 1 not abuse his discre-
tion in excluding it. 
[7] The plaintiff further contends tiiat 
some neon lights wrr _ '>r< 1-en and not light-
ed, and that th'a 'onst't ited further 
grounds of negligence for which the de-
fendant should be 1" tb!e. The evidence is 
without dispute that these lights had been 
or^inallv installed for decorative purposes 
bu ha 1 been inoperathe for saveral \ears. 
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The evidence is without dispute that there 
were three large parking lights in the park-
ing lot, that they were lighted at the time 
of the accident and they illuminated the 
entire area outside the store. The trial 
court did not find evidence of insufficient 
lighting that would take the case to the 
jury, nor do we 
Not every accident that occurs gives rise 
to a cause of action upon which the party 
injured may recover damages from some-
one. Thousands of accidents occur every 
day for wrhich no one is liable in damages, 
and often no one is to blame, not even the 
ones who are injured. The character or 
extent of an injury may have no bearing 
upon the question of the liability therefor; 
neither has the wealth no*- the poverty of 
either party to such a Miration anything to 
do \\ i*h the quest><>n of liability for the 
accident. 
The decision of i]" Hal ^ou.-t directing a 
verdict in favor of the defendant is af-
f u mod. 
ELLETT C. J., ard CPOPKETT, J , con-
cur 
WII KINS, J concurs in result. 
^AlTr.RAN J., dissenis 
T
*ALL, J , does not participate herein. 
/ w V
 v 
ST\N KATZ REM. ESTATE, INC., a 
corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Daniel 0. CF VVEZ, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 14775. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 20, 1977. 
In brei^h of contra*** action, the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Stewart 
M. Hanson, Sr., J., denied defendant's mo-
tion to set aside default judgment on 
ground that he had not been personally 
served and defendant appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Wiikins, J., held that in view 
of dispute on fact of usual place of abode of 
the defendant, arising from notation on re-
turn of process indicating that defendant 
lived with his mother and allegations in 
defendant's complaint denying that he was 
residing with his parents at time service 
was made upon his mother, court should 
have held an evidentiary hearing on the 
disputed factual issue. 
Reversed and rema ided. 
Crockett, J., filed concurring opinion. 
Process c^79 
In \iew of dispute on fact of usual 
place of abode of the defendant, arising 
from notation on return of process indicat-
ing that defendant iiv,'d with his mother 
and allegations in defendant's complaint de-
nying that he was residi \g with his parents 
at time service wras made upon his mother, 
coiir* should have held ?n evidentiary hear-
ing on the disputed factual issue Rules of 
Civi Ptocedure, rules 4'e), 43(e), 60(b). 
Gregory B. Wall, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and appellant 
0,-ry A. Weston, Salt Lake City, for 
plamtiff and respondent. 
WTLKINS, Justice: 
On April 18, 1974, the plaintiff filed a 
complaint against the defendant in the Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County seeking 
damage for the latter \\ alleged breach of 
contract. Service of process was made by a 
depvity constable on May 22, 1974, who left 
a copy of the summons and complaint with 
the defendant's mother at 1118 West 
Eighth South, Salt Lake City, Utah. A 
typewritten notation was placed on the 
proof or service return as follows: 
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ute, Bankruptcy Act of 1898). See also 
Restatement of Security § 202 (1941). 
The judgment of the lower court is af-
firmed, and the case is remanded for entry 
of judgment against Northwestern Nation-
al Insurance Company on its attachment 
release bond in accordance with this opin-
ion. Costs on appeal are awarded to re-
spondent Fitzgerald. 
GREENWOOD and DAVIDSON, JJ., 
concur. 
( O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
Dianne O'BRIEN, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Mike RUSH dba Mike's Garage, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 860078-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct. 13, 1987. 
Customer brought action against me-
chanic, seeking damages for difference be-
tween amount she paid for work performed 
on vehicle and value of that work and for 
depreciation of vehicle's value during time 
vehicle was wrongfully held by mechanic 
and punitive damages. The Second District 
Court, Weber County, John F. Wahlquist, 
J., entered judgment awarding customer 
compensatory and punitive damages, and 
mechanic appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Davidson, J., held that: (1) determination 
that value of work performed on custom-
er's vehicle was only $500 was not abuse of 
trial court's discretion; (2) trial court could 
use "blue book" as basis for determining 
average depreciation that applied to cus-
tomer's vehicle during ten months vehicle 
was wrongfully retained; and (3) customer 
was entitled to punitive damages. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error <s=> 1008.1(5) 
Trial court's findings of fact based on 
expert testimony were not clearly errone-
ous and thus, would not be set aside on 
appeal. Rules of Evid., Rule 702; Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a). 
2. Automobiles <3=368 
Determination that value of work me-
chanic performed on customer's vehicle 
was only $500, rather than $2,130.01 
charged to customer, was not abuse of trial 
court's discretion, based on expert testimo-
ny and evidence that work was not proper-
ly performed. 
3. Automobiles <3=>368 
Trial court was entitled to use National 
Automobile Dealers Association Official 
Used Car Guide, or "blue book," as basis 
for calculating average depreciation of cus-
tomer's vehicle during ten months vehicle 
was wrongfully retained by mechanic, par-
ticularly where mechanic failed to submit 
contrary evidence concerning vehicle's de-
preciation. Rules of Evid., Rule 803(17). 
4. Appeal and Error <s=*173(2) 
Issue of mitigation of damages could 
not be raised for first time on appeal In 
customer's action against mechanic for 
wrongfully retaining her vehicle. 
5. Damages <3=>91(1) 
Evidence that mechanic took full ad-
vantage of customer's lack of knowledge oi 
automotive matters by willfully charging 
premium prices for used parts, failing to 
properly repair vehicle, insisting on repay-
ment on terms other than those to which 
mechanic initirlly agreed and wrongfully 
retaining vehicle warranted award of puni-
tive damages to customer. 
6. Costs ^260(1) 
Showing of bad faith is not required to 
award attorney fees for ^ringing frivolous 
appeal. Court of Appeals Rule 33(a). 
7. Costs <e=>260(t) 
"Frivolous appeal," for purposes of 
rule permitting award of attorney fees 
against party who brings frivolous appeal. 
O'BRIEN v. RUSH 
Cite as 744 P Jd 306 (Utah App. 1987) 
has no reasonable legal or factual basis, as held by defendant 
defined in rule requiring counsel to sign 
each motion, brief, and other paper war-
ranting that action is well grounded in fact 
and warranted by existing law or good-
faith argument and is not interposed for 
improper purposes. Court of Appeals 
Rules 33(a), 40(a). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
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and punitive damages. 
We affirm and remand. 
8. Costs <3=>260(4) 
"Appeal brought for delay," for pur-
poses of rule authorizing award of attorney 
fees against party for bringing appeal for 
delay, is marked by dilatory conduct or 
conduct designed to mislead court and such 
appeal only benefits appellant. Court of 
Appeals Rule 33(a). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
9. Costs ®=>260(5) 
Customer was entitled to award of at-
torney fees upon mechanic's appeal from 
judgment awarding customer difference 
between "amount she paid for work per-
formed on vehicle and value of that work 
and damages resulting from depreciation 
of-vehicle's vralue during time vehicle was 
wrongfully held by mechanic; mechanic 
should have realized appeal had no reason-
able iegal or factual basis. Court of Ap-
peals Rule 33(a). 
John T. Caine, Richards, Caine & Rich-
ards, Public Defender Ass'n, Ogden, for 
defendant-appellant. 
Hoy Schunk. Ogden, for plaintiff-respon-
dent. 
OPINION 
Before ORME, DAVIDSON 
GARFF, JJ. 
and 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Defendant appeals from the judgment of 
the Second District Court which awarded 
plaintiff the difference between the amount 
she paid for work performed on her vehicle 
and the value of that work; the damages 
resulting from depreciation of the vehicle's 
value durl! >r the time it was wrongfully 
On May 16, 1983, plaintiff experienced 
engine problems with her 1976 Volkswagen 
bus. The following day, plaintiff drove the 
vehicle to defendant's garage where de-
fendant tentatively diagnosed the problem 
as a blown engine which would require a 
major overhaul. At trial, plaintiff contend-
ed that defendant quoted the repair cost to 
be a minimum of $1,000.00 to $1,200.00 
while defendant claimed he informed plain-
tiff that the repairs would cost between 
$1,200.00 and $1,600.00. Plaintiff consent-
ed to work beginning on the vehicle. De-
fendant testified that additional problems 
were found and that on June 15, 1983, he 
obtained plaintiffs approval for those re-
pairs which would increase the cost to over 
$1,800.00. Upon completion of the repairs, 
plaintiff was presented with a bill for 
$2,130.01. 
Plaintiff paid defendant $1,600.00, with a 
promise to pay the remainder, and defend-
ant released the vehicle to her. Almost 
immediately, the vehicle developed an oil 
leak which was repaired by defendant for a 
parts charge of $2.37. During August 
1923 while plaintiff vas returning to Utah 
from Idaho, plaintiffi; vehicle suffered a 
fire in the engine compartment and was 
later towed to defendant's garage. De-
fendant performed uia gnostic work on the 
vehicle to determine the cause of the fire 
for which he charged plaintiff $34.21. 
Plaintiff claims that defendant offered to 
repair the resultant damage for §1,000.00 
but she declined and requested that the 
vehicle be released to her. Defendant re-
fused to comply and held the vehicle on a 
claimed mechanics' lien because plaintiff 
still owed on the original work order, for 
the oil leak repair part, and for the diagno-
sis concerning the fire's cause. Defendant 
contended that plaintiff refused to execute 
a written agreement promising to pay the 
amount due according lo a specific sched-
ule. Defendant held plaintiffs vehicle for 
almost cen months until approximately July 
17, 1984, at which time she obtained a bond 
to necure its release. Trial to the court 
was held on September 20, 1984, at which 
time expert testimony was admitted which 
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enabled the court to establish the value of 
the work performed by defendant. Addi-
tionally, evidence was presented which was 
utilized to determine the vehicle's deprecia-
tion. 
The trial court made numerous findings 
of fact upon which the conclusions of law 
and the judgment were based. Those con-
clusions most pertinent to this appeal are: 
1. That the work done by the Defendant 
is in the amount of Five Hundred Dollars 
($500.00). This takes into consideration 
the Court's finding that obviously the 
work was not properly done or the oil 
leaks would not have been there, the 
over-charging for some parts, and the 
failure of the evidence to disclose the 
value of the broken part which was in-
stalled, the new clutch which was install-
ed, and the value of any other work 
which may remain. The Court's fixing 
of the sum of $500.00 [is] the best the 
Court can do on the evidence here 
presented. 
3. That the Claim for the existence of a 
lien is unfounded in law. That the pos-
session of the vehicle was released upon 
a promise to pay and a now obligation 
took its place. The return of the vehicle 
was not for further work but in an effort 
to settle a dispute over the other work 
which was done and did not reactivate 
(he Hen. 
4. That insistence upon the lien has 
caused the Plaintiff to lose the use of the 
veh'cle during that period of time, and 
concludes that the [vehicle] depreciated 
in value approximately Eii;ht Hundred 
Dollars ($800.00) during the period of 
time. 
7. The Court finds >hat the Defendant 
has made unwarranted claims that he 
had done work on the engine and install-
ed proper gaskets when he had not done 
so. The Court further finds that the 
Defendant asserted charges for parts 
that fwere) above and beyond that nor-
I. This conclusion of law appears to contain the 
i'imiinys of !:. ' upon which i: is based. Regard-
less of t!: • placement of ihc findings, they will 
mal in the trade. The Court further 
finds that Defendant, in reckless dis-
regard of whether the lien was or was 
not valid, inserted the presence of the 
lien and held up the delivery of the ve-
hicle for many months. The Court con-
siders that this is a valid consumer's 
complaint for unwarranted over-charging 
and assertions of invalid liens and assess-
es punitive damages in the amount of 
One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) there-
for.1 
The trial court's judgment was signed on 
October 17, 1984, and provides that plain-
tiff shall receive $1,100.00 as the difference 
between the amount she paid for defend-
ant's work and the value thereof, damages 
resulting from the vehicle's depreciation in 
value in the amount of $800.00 during the 
wrongful impoundment, and punitive dam-
ages of $1,000.00. Attorney fees of $1.00 
were also awarded because of the unlawful 
assertion of the lien by defendant. Be-
cause no evidence was offered as to the 
proper amount, the $1.00 was awarded. 
Defendant filed his notice of appeal on 
November 12, 1984. 
[1] At trial, in addition to the parties, 
the trial court heard u e testimony of three 
witnesses; one t;T defendant's witnesses 
was accepted by thn • ourt as an expert in 
automotive repairs pursuant to Utah 
R.Evid. !0'A. Plaintiffs witness was a 
school teacher who for approximately 2o 
years als'o operated a machine shop which 
primarily worked on automobile engines. 
Defendant':; other witness was an individu-
al he employed ao a mechanic. Utah 
K.Civ.P. 52(a) states that findings of fact 
"shall not be set aside unless clearly erro-
neous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity Gf the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses." We accept 
the findings of fac* of the trial court as 
they are based on the expert testimony, 
because Ihey cannot be categorized as 
"clearly erroneous," and they also appear 
to comply with the Utah Supreme Court's 
be considered in the same manner as if they 
were more conventionally placed. 
O'BRIEN v. RUSH 
Cite as 744 P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1987) 
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pronouncements concerning findings as 
stated in Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 
999 (Utah 1987). 
[2] Defendant asserts that the trial 
court erred in finding that the value of 
defendant's work performed was only 
$500.00. In addition to what we have al-
ready stated concerning findings of fact, 
this issue is effectively disposed of by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Clayton v. Cross-
roads Equipment Co., 655 P.2d 1125, 1130 
(Utah 1982), where Justice Howe wrote, 
"In fixing damages the trial court is vested 
with broad discretion and the award will 
not be set aside unless it is manifestly 
unjust or indicates that the trial court ne-
glected pertinent elements, or was unduly 
influenced by prejudice or other extraneous 
circumstances." Essentially, the court be-
low had to determine what damages plain-
tiff suffered when she paid for work which 
was not properly performed. We believe 
the trial court carefully weighed the testi-
mony and determined the value of the work 
performed by defendant which was then 
subtracted from what plaintiff had previ-
ously paid. She had bargained for a proper 
engine overhaul but received something far 
less. The damage award on this issue is 
affirmed. 
[3] Defendant contends that there is in-
sufficient evidence to sustain the trial 
court's award of $800.00 as the vehicle's 
depreciation during the period it was held 
by defendant. The trial transcript indi-
cates that the court received a copy of the 
National Automobile Dealers Association 
Official Used Car Guide (Sept. 1984) into 
evidence. This is the "blue book" referred 
to by counsel in the transcript and it pro-
vides a range of prices for used cars back 
to and including 1977 models. Plaintiffs 
counsel suggested that an average depreci-
ation could be determined which could be 
applied to 1976 model vehicles. Defendant 
failed to submit contrary evidence concern-
ing the vehicle's depreciation. The trial 
court based its conclusion as to the depreci-
ation on a "published [compilation], gener-
ally used and relied upon by the public or 
by persons in particular occupations." 
Utah Rlivid. 803(17). 
[4] Defendant also raises the issue of 
plaintiffs failure to mitigate her damages 
by failing to post a bond to secure release 
of her vehicle. Plaintiffs mitigation of 
damages was not at issue at trial and will 
not now be heard for the first time on 
appeal. Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 
100, 102 (Utah 1983). 
[5] Defendant objects to the award of 
punitive damages as being unsupported by 
the evidence. At kin Wright & Miles r. 
Mountain States Tel., 709 P.2d 330, 337 
(Utah 1985), states "Before punitive dam-
ages may be awrarded, the plaintiff must 
prove conduct that is willful and malicious, 
or that manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference and disregard toward the 
rights of others" (citations omitted). See 
Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80 (Utah App. 
1987). The court below concluded that de-
fendant exhibited a reckless disregard to-
ward the validity of the lien upon which he 
held plaintiffs vehicle. The evidence 
shows defendant's conduct throughout this 
matter as being rather cavi_lier as it relates 
to the Pmount of time he took in making 
his repairs, the manner in which the repairs 
were conducted as evidenced by plaintiffs 
continuing problems and her vehicle's sub-
sequent repair by another mechanic, and 
defendant's unwarranted insistence on re-
payment on terms other than those to 
which he initially agreed. The totality of 
the circumstances supports the conclusion 
that defendant took full advantage of plain-
tiffs lack of knowledge of automotive mat-
ters and her problems at that moment in 
time. His willful use of used parts, while 
charging premium prices for them as if 
they were new, is unconscionable. The 
award of punitive damages is proper. This 
is exactly the type of case calling for their 
award. 
[6] Plaintiff requests attorney fees in-
curred in responding to this appeal. This 
Court in Eames v. Envies, 735 P.2d 395, 
398 (Utah App.1987), awarded attorney 
fees in a situation in which the "totality of 
defendant's argument" caused us to be-
lieve the appeal was frivolous. That alone 
meets the technical requirements of R.Utah 
Ct.App. 33(a). However, we then went on 
to state that defendant's argument "fails 
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to meet th.» s t n ^ h n l s of g<v:d faith and 
R.Utah Ct.App. WM-x) appliesA Id. The 
last statement would tend to imply that 
R.Utah Ct.App. 33(a) requires this Court to 
find bad faith before attorney fees can be 
awarded. This is not so. Cady v-. John-
son, 671 P.2d .149 (Utah 1983), which was 
cited in Ea?nes concerns the award of at-
torney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56 (1981). The standard in that 
section specifically includes an examination 
into the good faith of a litigant. That is 
appropriate in the trial court which is al-
ready involved in receiving evidence. Such 
a subjective standard is inappropriate for 
an appellate court. 
Rule 33(a) states that attorney fees may 
be awarded when the "motion made or an 
appeal taken under these rules is either 
frivolous or for delay " While it may 
be possible to determine when an action is 
taken for delay, the question of what is a 
frivolous appeal is more difficult. In 
Cady, 671 P.2d at 151, the Utah Supreme 
Court equated frivolous with being without 
merit. We agree. A frivolous appeal is 
one without merit. But something more 
must be required or we will find ourselves 
in a "loser pay" situation. 
[7,81 In reviewing the body of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals we find 
Rule 40(a) v/hich gives some guidance. 
This rule requires counsel, or a party if 
without counsel, to sign each "motion, 
brief, and other paper. . . ." The rule fur-
ther states: 
The signature of an attorney or a party 
constitutes a certificate that the attorney 
or the party has read the motion, brief, 
or other paper; that to the best of the 
attorney's or the party's knowledge, in-
formation, and belief, formed after rea-
sonable inquiry, it is well grounded in 
fact and is warranted by existing law or 
a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law; 
and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purposes such as to harass or 
cause unnecessary delay or needless in-
crease in the cost of litigation. 
This language offers a definition of what is 
frivolous. Further, the definition is suffi-
ciently objective that this court can apply it 
without di-lving into the subieeiive intent of 
the parties. For purposes of Rule 33(a) of 
the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals we 
define a "frivolous appeal" as one having 
no reasonable legal or factual basis as de-
fined in Rule 40(a). An appeal brought for 
delay is one marked by dilatory conduct or 
conduct designed to mislead the court and 
which benefits only the appellant. 
[9] It may be argued that the imposi-
tion of this definition creates a lesser stan-
dard than that created by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56 (1981) which requires lack of 
good faith. We do not disagree. How-
ever, since a party has already been to 
court once and has had the benefit of one 
ruling, the decision to appeal should be 
reached only after careful consideration by 
the party and counsel. 
Applying the above analysis to this case 
it is obvious that the trial court found no 
merit in the contentions of defendant In 
reviewing the trial results it should have 
been equally obvious that the appeal had 
no reasonable legal or factual basis. The 
record shows that defendant took advan-
tage of plaintiff both through unfair deal-
ings with her and by holding her vehicle 
for an extended period of time without 
regard to her rights. It is apparent that 
defendant intended to force plaintiff to pay 
by holding her vehicle and thereby causing 
her greal inconvenience. The record fur-
ther shows the trial jud^e carefully fash-
ioning relief after a fair opportunity for 
hearing. Defendant's claims on appeal 
simply controvert the findings of the court 
The clains are eot only without merit but 
are also without basis in ;aw or fact 
Plaintiff is ' n J t ' j l to the benefit of Rule 
33(a). 
The judiiruent of the crial court is af-
firmed and the case is remanded for a 
determination of plaintiTs attorney fees 
on appeal which are ordered to be paid by 
defendant. Double costs are ordered 
against deAndant pursuant to R.Utah Ct. 
App. 33(a). 
ORME and GARFF, J.J., concur. 
CADY v. 
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so insubstantial or inconclusive that reason-
able minds must have entertained a reason-
able doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime charged.23 
[11] Defendant contends that the plain-
tiff's evidence failed to show that defend-
ant acted with the requisite criminal negli-
gence in causing the death of Nina Fuelle-
man. Our review of the record, however, 
leads to a contrary conclusion. There was 
ample evidence adduced at trial to establish 
defendant's criminal negligence. That evi-
dence is: (1) defendant knew that Nina 
Fuelleman was somewhere in the house 
during the argument between Robert and 
himself, because the three had come home 
together; (2) immediately following the ar-
gument, defendant went to his bedroom 
and took out the rifle; (3) live ammunition 
was found near where defendant was 
standing when the gun fired, supporting 
the inference that defendant loaded the gun 
or knew it was loaded; (4) defendant was 
pointing the gun in the direction of his 
brother when it fired; (5) the gun could not 
have ftred unless the trigger was pulled 
with a conscious effort; (6) the rifle wras 
held at or near the shoulder, supporting the 
inference that defendant was aiming or at-
tempting to aim the gun when it fired; (7) 
defendant lied to the police about why he 
was holding the gun, supporting the infer-
ence that the gun did not fire accidentally; 
and (8) the gun was fired while defendant 
held it, killing Nina Fuelleman. We con-
sider this evidence to be substantial and 
sufficiently conclusive to sustain the trial 
court's verdict. 
The conviction and judgment of the trial 
court are affirmed. 
STEWART, OAKS, HOWE and DUR-
HAM, JJ., concur. 
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Jon Michael CADY and Carolyn Cady, 
husband and wife, Telford Realty Com-
pany and Rich Edwards, dba All Seasons 
Realty, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Reta May JOHNSON and Jared L. John-
son, Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 18373. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 20, 1983. 
Prospective vendors, realty company, 
and salesman who prepared offer brought 
action against prospective sellers, who indi-
cated their desire not to purchase home, 
seeking damages for expenses incurred in 
having to resell home and damages on be-
half of all plaintiffs for loss of real estate 
commission. The Second District Court, 
Davis County, Douglas L. Cornaby, J., en-
tered judgment against plaintiffs and 
awarded defendants attorney fees, and ap-
peal was taken. The Supreme Court, 
Howe, J., held that: (1) plaintiffs were not 
entitled to recover for lost real estate com-
mission, and (2) defendants were improper-
ly awarded attorney fees. 
Affirmed in part and vacated in part. 
1. Principal and Agent o=>12 
Only a written power of attorney will 
authorize one to bind another to a contract 
for the sale of real property. 
2. Principal and Agent e=>12 
Since there was no written power of 
attorney allowing one defendant to enter 
into agreement on behalf of his mother, 
another defendant, and therefore no autho-
rization was established, there was no con-
tract nor any right to recover under theo-
ries of donee or creditor beneficiaries, and 
23. State v. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 
(1930); State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (1976). 
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thus cause of action in which plaintiffs 
sought lost real estate commission was 
properly dismissed. 
3. Costs o=»173(l) 
Even though prospective vendors, real-
ty company, and salesman who prepared 
offer had no legal basis for recovery of 
additional damages after prospective ven-
dors had retained earnest money deposit, so 
that their claim was without merit, prospec-
tive purchasers were not entitled to recover 
attorney fees, in that plaintiffs' conduct did 
not rise to level of lack of good faith. U.C. 
A.1953, 78-27-56. 
Melvin C. Wilson, Farmington, for plain-
tiffs and appellants. 
C. DeMont Judd, Jr., Ogden, for defend-
ants and respondents. 
HOWE, Justice: 
This appeal arises from a suit brought by 
plaintiffs Jon and Carolyn Cady, husband 
and wife, Teiford Realty and Rich Edwards. 
On July 8, 1980, the Cadys received a writ-
ten offer from defendants, Jared and Reta 
May Johnson, to purchase their home in 
Kaysville, Utah. At that time the home 
was being advertised for sale by Telford 
Realty under a listing agreement. Rich 
Edwards, a salesman for All Seasons Real-
ty, prepared the offer which was signed 
"Reta May Johnson by Jared Johnson, son" 
as purchaser. Jared also gave Edwards a 
$500 check drawn on his mother's bank 
account as earnest money. The Cadys ac-
cepted the offer. 
On August 19, 1980. the Cadys vacated 
their home. A closing date on the sale was 
set for August 25. Financing arrange-
ments had been submitted and approved. 
On August 25, the defendants did not ap-
pear for closing. One week later, Edwards 
received a letter from defendants indicating 
their desire not to purchase the home and 
requesting the return of their $500 earnest 
money deposit. Plaintiffs refused, retained 
the earnest money deposit and brought suit 
for additional damages for breach, of con-
tract or, in the alternative, for equitable 
relief for failure to perform the contract. 
Plaintiffs' first cause of action sought 
damages for expenses they incurred in hav-
ing to re-sell their home. This action was 
dismissed at trial on their own motion on 
the strength of Andreasen r. Hansen, 8 
Utah 2d 370, 335 P.2d 404 (1959), and has 
not been appealed. Their second cause of 
action sought damages on behalf of all 
plaintiffs for the lost real estate commis-
sion. They contend that Edwards, who re-
ceived nothing when the home was later 
re-sold, should receive the value of his serv-
ices under a principle of either equity or 
third-party beneficiary contract, despite the 
Cadys' election to retain the earnest money 
as liquidated damages. In their answer, 
defendants alleged that Jared Johnson was 
not properly authorized to enter into the 
agreement in behalf of Reta May Johnson, 
his mother. They also alleged that plain-
tiffs holding real estate licenses knew or 
should have known that the statute of 
frauds, U.C.A., 1953, § 25-5-1, requires 
written authorization from one to allow an-
other to bind him to a contract for the 
purchase of real property. The trial court 
dismissed the second cause of action pursu-
ant to § 25-5-1. 
Defendants then asked that attorney's 
fees be awarded them pursuant to U.C.A., 
1953, § 78-27-56, and the trial court 
awarded $1,592 in fees against plaintiffs. 
The amount was based on figures presented 
by defendants' attorney that he and former 
counsel had spent 24.5 hours at $65.00 per 
hour in defending the lawsuit. The trial 
court found this amount reasonable. I*i 
ad livm. the trial cou^t entered supplemen-
tal findings of fact that plaintiffs did not 
have an actionable claim; yet they had 
assured the trial judge that there would be 
mat-dial issues at ir\i>\ and it was not until 
trial that the judge found there were no 
such issues. It was also concluded by the 
trial judge that ha I plaintiffs researched 
the law, they wou-d have known their 
claims were meritless and could have saved 
the court time in not having to go to trial. 
CADY v. 
Cite as 671 P.2d 
|1,2] Plaintiffs now contend that the 
trial court erred in summarily dismissing 
their second cause of action without ad-
dressing the issues of whether or not plain-
tiffs were donee or creditor beneficiaries. 
We disagree. Before considering what type 
of contract exists, the trial court must satis-
fy the most fundamental of contract law 
principles; that is, was there a contract? 
Utah law is clear that only a written power 
of attorney will authorize one to bind an-
other to a contract for the sale of real 
property. 
No estate or interest in real property . . . 
shall be created . . . otherwise than by 
deed or conveyance in writing subscribed 
by the party creating . . . or by his lawful 
agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
U.C.A., § 25-5-1 (1953 as amended). 
In the instant case, there was no dispute as 
to the absence of the written power of 
attorney. Therefore, no authorization was 
ever established. There being no authoriza-
tion, there could be no contract; there be-
ing no contract, Lhere could be no right to 
recover under theories of donee or creditor 
beneficiaries. Therefore, the trial court 
correctly dismissed the plaintiffs' second 
cause of action. 
Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court 
erred in awarding attorney's fees to defend-
ants pursuant to U.CA./l9"3, § 78-27-56 
which was enact' d in 1981 providing that: 
In civil actions, where not otherwise pro-
vided by st.itute or agreement, the court 
may award reasonable attorney's fees to 
a prevailing party if the court determines 
that the action or defense to the action 
was without merit and not brought or 
asserted in good faith. 
[3] The statute is narrowly drawn. It 
was not meant to be applied to all prevail-
ing parties in all civil suits. To safeguard 
against too broad an application, two ele-
ments are required in addition to being a 
prevailing party. First, the claim must be 
"without merit." We have not heretofore 
had occasion to define this term. However, 
under a provision of the Federal Securities 
Act which awards attorney's fees "if the 
court believes the suit or defense to have 
JOHNSOxN Utah 151 
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been without merit," it was stated in Can-
Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d 371 
(10th Cir.1964), that the term implies bor-
dering on frivolity. The dictionary defini-
tion of "frivolous" is "of little weight or 
importance having no basis in law or fact." 
While there may be some distinction be-
tween these two terms in other areas of the 
law, for purposes of this statute we believe 
the terms are synonymous. While this defi-
nition may lack some of the nuances found 
in common law definitions, it adequately 
serves the purpose of the statute before us 
and is clearly understood. See Morton v. 
Allied Stores Corp., 90 F.R.D. 352 (D.Colo. 
1981). In the instant case, the plaintiffs 
clearly had no legal basis for recovery of 
additional damages after the Cadys had re-
tained the earnest money deposit, Andreas-
en v. Hansen, supra, and in face of the 
statute of frauds. Therefore, we affirm the 
trial court's finding that the claim was 
"without merit." 
In addition to finding the claim to lack 
merit, the trial court must also find that 
plaintiffs' conduct in bringing suit was 
lacking in good faith. In Tacoma Assoc of 
Credit Men v. Lester, 72 Wash.2d 453, 458, 
433 P.2d 901, 904 (1967), the court defined 
"g<.'»d faith" as: 
(1) An honest belief in the propriety of 
' b - activities in question; (2) no intent to 
take unconscionable advantage of others; 
and (3) no intent to. ;>r knowledge of the 
fact that the activities in question will, 
[sic] hinder, delay or defraud others. 
To establish lack of good faith, one must 
prove that one or more of these factors is 
lacking. Sparkman and McLean Co. v. Ber-
ber, 4 Wash.App. 341. 481 P.2d 585 (1971). 
The federal courts offer a similar defini-
tion, however, inversely stated. Bad faith 
must be found in order to award attorney's 
fees to a prevailing party. See Ki linear-
Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 
441 F.2d 631 (5th Cir.1971); Cleveland v. 
Second Natl Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.2d 
466 (6th Cir.1945). Bad faith is found when 
one of the three elements heretofore stated 
is lacking. While there may be a distinc-
tion between bad faith and "lack of good 
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faith" in other areas of the law. for pur-
poses of U.C.A., 1953, § 78-27-56, the two 
terms are synonymous. 
Attorney's fees have boon denied where 
the proceedings instituted by the unsuccess-
ful party were not initiated in bad faith or 
for the purpose of vexation or harassment. 
See Medtronic, Inc. v. Mine Safety Appli-
ances Co., 468 F.Supp. 1132 (D.Minn.1980); 
Walker v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc., 443 F.2d 33 (7th Cir.1971). In Catan-
zaro v. Masco Corp., 423 F.Supp. 415 (D.Del. 
1976), the court refused to grant attorney's 
fees, although plaintiffs' action for patent 
infringement was legally unsupportable 
where the record did not affirmatively es-
tablish either bad faith or the possibility of 
self-induced myopia. In Chicago Title & 
Trust Co. v. Fox Theaters Corp., 178 
F.Supp. 899 (D.N.Y.1959), the court denied 
the respondent's request for attorney's fees, 
notwithstanding dismissal of the petition in 
a twenty-year-old equity receivership ac-
tion. The proceeding was doubtless lacking 
in merit, the court conceded, adding how-
ever, thai it could not be said that it was 
necessarily brought in bad faith or for pur-
poses of vexation or harassment. In other 
words, not only must there be substantial 
evidence that the claim was lacking basis in 
either bT" o** fact and therefore frivolous, 
but. there must also be sufficient evidence 
that the unsuccessful party lacked at least 
one of the good faith elements heretofore 
stated. See Sparkman and McLean Co., 
supra, \). r>91. 
In the inr-tant case, the •rial co^rt found 
lack '.f >rood faith because had plaintiffs 
research' h the issue as instructed at pre-tri-
al conference, thev woald have Uncovered 
they had no valid claim and they could have 
saved the court valuable time by avoiding 
trial. We disagree that this conduct consti-
tutes bad faith. Plaintiffs were clearly 
pursuing a merit Jess claim and better prep-
aration might well have disclosed that to 
them. However, that conduct does not rise 
to lack of good faith. The evidence must 
also affirmatively establish a lack of at 
least one of the three elements of good 
faith heretofore discussed. There was no 
evidence that plaintiffs lacked an honest 
(although ill-formed) belief in their claim; 
that they had an intent to take an uncon-
scionable advantage of defendants; nor 
that they had the intent to, or knowledge 
that their suit would hinder, delay or de-
fraud defendants. Tacorna Assoc, of Credit 
Men v. Lester, supra. 
The judgment is affirmed except the 
award of attorney's fees to defendants is 
vacated. Each party to bear his own costs. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
O I KEYNUMBER SYSTEM 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Jeffrey Dean BAKER, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 18245. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 21, 1983. 
Defendant was convicted \n the Third 
District <\>ur!f Salt Lake O-j.-tv, Kryant H. 
Croft, J., '>i burglary, av.i he appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that: 
(1) "necessarily included oifense" standard 
for determining whether to give instruction 
on lesser included offen-e should be limited 
to cases vhere prosecution requests instruc-
tion, and vhere defendant requests instruc-
tion, standard is whether evidence warrants 
it, and (2) evidence did not warrant giving 
of instruction on offense of criminal tres-
pass. 
Affirmed. 
Hall C.J., concurred in result 
